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Quick Job Entry or Long-Term Human Capital Development? 
The Dynamic Effects of Alternative Training Schemes
* 
 
This study evaluates and compares the effectiveness of two alternative training schemes for 
the unemployed: short, job-search oriented training and long, human capital oriented training. 
We investigate the impact dynamics of these programs considering both unemployment and 
employment duration. Our analysis uses a rich administrative longitudinal data set for 
Germany where both programs were implemented at the same time. Our estimation strategy 
flexibly accounts for dynamic selection on observables and unobservables as well as 
heterogeneous treatment effects. The results indicate that short-term training schemes can 
be an effective tool to reduce unemployment in the long run, in particular if participation 
occurs early during unemployment. Long-term training schemes increase the average 
duration of employment spells more strongly than short-term training. However, they increase 
the expected unemployment duration if they are started early during unemployment. This 
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What is the best design of training schemes for the unemployed? Ideally, policy
makers would like to devise schemes that lead to quick job entry as well as long
employment spells. Existing training schemes typically stress either human capital
development or labor force attachment. Long-term training schemes oﬀer compre-
hensive instruction in occupational skills and operational techniques. While they fo-
cus on improvement in the productivity of the unemployed, they usually do not aim
at rapid reemployment. Previous work shows that program participation reduces
job ﬁnding rates of participants (lock-in eﬀect), and positive employment eﬀects
only appear some time after completion of the program (Couch, 1992, Hotz et al.
2006, Fitzenberger et al. 2009, Lechner et al. 2009). Moreover, long-term training
schemes are relatively expensive. In contrast, job search assistance programs com-
prise job readiness training and instruction in job search skills. They focus on quick
job entry and are inexpensive. However, the limited set of skills provided may not
be suﬃcient to improve employment stability in the long run.
Recent policy reforms implemented in 1996 in the US2 and in the late 1990s to
early 2000s in Canada and the European countries3 place increased emphasis on
short-term activation and work-ﬁrst strategies. Yet evidence from existing research
does not support the conclusion that either of the two approaches – quick job entry
or long-term human capital development – outperforms the other in terms of em-
ployment rates, but shows rather mixed results (see Dyke et al., 2006, Hotz et al.,
2006, Biewen et al., 2008)4. In fact, diﬀerent programs may have distinct impacts
on unemployment and employment spells of participants. Static comparisons of em-
ployment rates at some given point in time after program participation confound
these diﬀerences and may thus lead to opposite conclusions regarding the relative
eﬀectiveness of one program compared to another.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine, from a dynamic perspective, how
diﬀerent training schemes aﬀect the employment histories of trainees. Our focus is on
comparison of short-term, job-search oriented training and long-term, human capital
2See e.g. Blank (2002) for a survey of the contents and aims of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.
3Further information on the recent policy trends and reforms in these countries can be found
in European Commission (2002), and OECD (2005, ch. 4; 2006).
4For surveys comparing the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent active labor market programs in the US
as well as in other countries see e.g. Heckman et al. (1999), Martin and Grubb (2001), and Card
et al. (2009). Meyer (1995) and Ashenfelter et al. (2005) survey experimental evaluations of job
search programs conducted in the US.
1oriented training, that were administered at the same time in Germany. We evaluate
their eﬀects on both unemployment and employment spells. We further examine
how the impacts of training during unemployment vary with elapsed unemployment
duration at program start and with time relative to the scheduled program end. Our
analysis provides a detailed picture of the dynamics of training impacts as well as an
assessment of the overall impacts of training that contrasts short-run and long-run
eﬀects. We have access to unique administrative data that contain highly accurate
information on periods of employment, job search, beneﬁt receipt, and program
participation of individuals. The data also comprise a large variety of covariate
information. This allows us to model the transitions into diﬀerent labor market
states and training programs in a very ﬂexible way using a continuous time duration
framework. Due to the particular richness of our data, identiﬁcation of our estimated
model does not rely on the functional form assumptions (i.e. proportionality between
time and covariate eﬀects) that are commonly imposed in the duration literature.
An important problem in the evaluation literature is the nonrandom sorting of in-
dividuals into programs. Our research design is based on the timing-of-events ap-
proach to program evaluation by Abbring and van den Berg (2003a). This approach
allows for selection into training based on observables as well as unobservables. The
identiﬁcation strategy is based on the assumption that there is random variation in
the timing of program participation during unemployment. This requires that the
exact moment of program start is not perfectly anticipated at the individual level.
Under this assumption the durations in unemployment until employment and until
program participation can be modeled as a two equation system with correlated
unobservables using identiﬁcation results from the competing risks literature. By
recognizing that the treatment aﬀects the duration until employment only from the
moment of program start onwards, the treatment eﬀect can be traced out as the
diﬀerential dependence between the durations until employment and until program
participation that arises after program start. As we will show below, the assumption
of random variation in program starts is plausible in the institutional setup under-
lying this study. In Germany, training programs may potentially take place at any
point in time during unemployment and program assignment depends on short-term
supply factors that are beyond the control of the job seekers and unknown to them.
This modeling approach allows identiﬁcation of the causal treatment eﬀect from sin-
gle spell data with time constant covariates under some functional form restrictions:
in particular, proportionality of the hazard rate in its three components, elapsed
time, observed covariates, and unobservables, and independence between observed
and unobserved variables. These assumptions can be relaxed if multiple spells or
2time-varying regressors are available. In our analysis, we include both repeated
spells per individual and time-varying covariates. This improves the robustness and
credibility of our estimation results because in our case identiﬁcation does not rely
on these parametric assumptions.
A dynamic approach has several advantages over a static framework that is usually
applied in the evaluation literature. First, it allows a separate analysis of the impact
of training on unemployment and employment durations. Thus, it provides a more
detailed understanding of how diﬀerent training programs work.5 Second, in many
evaluation settings, as is the case here as well, program assignment is not a static
decision problem but is dynamically related to the success of job search. Under
these circumstances, an evaluation approach, which uses a static indicator for re-
ceiving treatment, yields biased treatment eﬀects because it implicitly conditions on
future outcomes.6 A dynamic approach of the type we use here avoids this problem
because it explicitly models the dynamic treatment assignment process. Third, the
dynamic approach used in this paper allows – in addition – an analysis of the eﬀect
of the timing of program participation during unemployment. The optimal timing
of treatment has been widely neglected in the literature although it is an important
dimension of treatment eﬀect heterogeneity. On the one hand, job ﬁnding rates
typically vary with elapsed unemployment duration. On the other hand, the impact
of training on the job ﬁnding probability varies over time. It is typically negative
during program participation and positive thereafter. This suggests that job ﬁnding
rates of participants in training are a complex function of time and may vary widely
across this dimension. Finally, a continuous time duration model avoids speciﬁcation
issues that arise as a consequence of discretization of inherently continuous dynamic
features of the data.
There exists a small literature using the timing-of-events approach to evaluate train-
ing or active job-search programs, see e.g. Crépon et al. (2005), Hujer et al. (2006a,
b), Lalive et al. (2008), Richardson and van den Berg (2006), and Weber and Hofer
(2004). This study extends the existing research by simultaneously taking into ac-
count the following important points. First, unlike many of the previous studies
applying the timing-of-events approach, this study analyzes two outcomes: unem-
ployment and employment duration. This is important for assessing and comparing
the overall eﬀectiveness of the programs, as they may impact diﬀerently on unem-
5This point is also put forward by Ham and LaLonde (1996) who use a duration framework to
study the eﬀects of a randomly assigned training program for disadvantaged women in the US on
unemployment and employment spells of trainees.
6Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) analyze the biases of a static approach when treatment
assignment is in fact dynamic.
3ployment and employment duration. Second, this paper compares two alternative
types of training within a uniﬁed context and allows for heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects across observed and unobserved characteristics. Third, due to data or compu-
tational restrictions, previous work typically used a rather limited set of regressors,
subsuming a large part of the remaining selection eﬀects in the one dimensional in-
dex of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, in these studies, treatment eﬀects were
typically identiﬁed through functional form restrictions. The mainstream, static lit-
erature on program evaluation, in contrast, aims at nonparametric identiﬁcation and
estimation of treatment eﬀects. In particular, matching methods rely on rich and
ﬂexible speciﬁcations of the selection into treatment based on observables. However,
unlike the dynamic event history approach to program evaluation, they do not allow
for selection on unobservables. The empirical analysis in this paper resolves these
trade-oﬀs. We apply the dynamic evaluation approach to particularly rich data al-
lowing us to model selection on observables in a highly ﬂexible way as is common
with matching methods, while at the same time accounting for selection on unob-
servables. In addition, since we use time-varying regressors and repeated spells per
individual, our estimation results are not driven by functional form assumptions.
Finally, this paper not only presents the instantaneous impacts of training on the
exit rates out of unemployment and employment, but also the way treatment eﬀects
are reﬂected in changes in expected unemployment and employment duration. This
allows us to translate the results into economically meaningful quantities that are of
direct interest to economists and policy makers. The expected outcome durations
are further used for cost-beneﬁt calculations that give some guidance on the ﬁnancial
eﬃciency of the two programs.
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on a unique administrative data set
for Germany. Germany is an interesting case to study because its recent reforms
and developments in the ﬁeld of labor market policy closely reﬂect the recommen-
dations formulated in the international policy debate in the mid-1990s in view of
high unemployment levels especially in the European countries (cf. European Com-
mission, 2002, on the “European Employment Strategy” and OECD, 2006, on the
“OECD Jobs Strategy”). As in most other OECD countries, training schemes with a
focus on human capital development have traditionally been the cornerstone of ac-
tive labor market policy in Germany. However, recently the policy focus has shifted
towards measures that activate the unemployed in the short run. Short-term train-
ing schemes have gained in importance. From 1999 to 2004, the period covered by
our analysis, their share in all training schemes increased from 35% to 75% (see
Appendix A, table A1). Short-term training schemes provide skills that facilitate
4job search and last only one month on average. The traditional long-term training
schemes, on the contrary, have an average duration of nine months. Due to this
diﬀerence in length, short-term training costs per participant make up only a tenth
of those of traditional training (see Appendix A, table A2).
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Short, job-search oriented training schemes can
in fact be an eﬀective and ﬁnancially proﬁtable tool to reduce unemployment in the
long run, in particular if participation occurs early during unemployment. Long-
term training schemes may increase the expected unemployment duration if they
are started early during unemployment. This negative short-run impact of long-
term training is an important driver of its overall eﬀectiveness. Therefore, it should
rather not be given to newly unemployed individuals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
the institutional setup and the enrolment into training. Section 3 explains important
conceptual aspects of dynamic program evaluation. Section 4 describes the empirical
strategy and its implementation. In section 5, we outline the construction of our
analysis sample and provide a descriptive analysis. Section 6 discusses the empirical
results, and section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains further information on the
institutional context, the data source used, a description of the variables used in the
estimation and the complete estimation results.
2 Institutional Setting
2.1 Training Programs Analyzed
Training schemes are the most important type of active labor market policy in
Germany as in many other OECD countries.7 In our analysis, we focus on the
following two types of training schemes: human capital oriented long-term training
and job-search oriented short-term training.
Long-term training schemes comprise a variety of programs ranging from advanced
vocational training and refresher courses on speciﬁc professional skills and opera-
tional techniques to comprehensive retraining in a new vocational degree within the
German apprenticeship system. The former typically last between six and twelve
months whereas retraining takes two to three years. Training programs can take
7Further information on the regulation of training as well as some aggregate ﬁgures on the
quantitative importance of training in the context of German active labor market policy can be
found in Appendix A.
5place either in classrooms, simulated workplaces, ﬁrms or a combination thereof.
Typical examples of long-term training programs include training on marketing and
sales strategies, computer assisted bookkeeping, operating construction machines,
and specialist courses in speciﬁc legal ﬁelds.
Short-term training courses last a couple of days to twelve weeks. Similar to the
long-term training schemes, they may take place oﬀ-the-job or on-the-job. However,
due to their shorter length their contents are less occupation speciﬁc and the hu-
man capital component is limited. Typical examples of short-term training schemes
include job application training, basic computer courses, language courses and short-
term internships at a simulated or real workplace. The aim of this type of training
is twofold. On the one hand, it provides skills that improve and facilitate job search.
On the other hand, it is employed to assess a job-seeker’s abilities and his readiness
to work or to participate in a further program.
2.2 Enrolment into Training
Training programs in the context of active labor market policy are oﬀered continu-
ously throughout the year. Registered job-seekers may participate in a program at
any point in time during their unemployment spell. The job-seeker and the case-
worker at the local employment agency meet repeatedly during the unemployment
spell and discuss further search strategies and program participation. The unem-
ployed may also just receive a written invitation to participate in a program. An
assignment requires the approval of the caseworker who has to judge a participation
as necessary in order to improve the employment prospects of the person under
consideration. Participation is mandatory once a job-seeker has been assigned to
a speciﬁc course or has received a training voucher. Non-compliance may entail a
temporary suspension of beneﬁts. However, job placement has priority over program
participation. The unemployed are encouraged to continue job search at any time,
even while participating in a training program.
For short-term training throughout the entire period considered in this paper and
for long-term training before the so called Hartz-Reform in 2003, assignment into
programs was to a large extent driven by the supply of courses (cf. Schneider et al.,
2006). In an informal procedure, the employment agencies stipulated in advance
the quantities and contents of the training courses to be supplied by the training
providers for a given calendar year. They committed themselves to ﬁll them with
participants throughout the year. The actual allocation of unemployed to the diﬀer-
6ent courses was strongly subject to the discretion of the caseworker. Blaschke and
Plath (2000) report that private indicators of the caseworker like the composition
of a group of participants in a particular course or his assessment of the motivation
of the unemployed played an important role. Assignment into training programs
often occurred at very short notice. Some types of training schemes did not have
ﬁxed start and end dates in the sense that a group of participants started a course
with a ﬁxed scheduled duration together at some date that had been speciﬁed in
advance. Rather, the schemes continued over an indeﬁnite period of time and new
participants enrolled for a varying scheduled duration determined by the caseworker
as soon as previous participants left it (Blaschke and Plath, 2000). Anecdotal evi-
dence in Schneider et al. (2006) suggests that belated assignments and referrals on
very short notice were commonly used in order to assure a high capacity utilization
of booked courses and to keep up job search incentives.
Since 2003, candidates for a long-term training program obtain a voucher that is
valid for one to three months and that speciﬁes a training ﬁeld.8 The candidate
then redeems the voucher by choosing on his own a suitable course from a pool of
certiﬁed courses. This reform intended to make the allocation of training programs
more targeted and better tailored towards the needs of the unemployed. However,
its original goals were impaired by important diﬃculties in the implementation of
the new system. In particular, it turned out that training providers tended to
collect vouchers until a suﬃcient critical number of participants was reached or
they shortly canceled scheduled courses if there were too few participants (Kühnlein
and Klein, 2003, Schneider et al., 2006). Therefore, potential participants faced a
high uncertainty regarding the start of a chosen program. According to surveys
conducted by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB)
among training providers, in 2003 and 2004, 50% and 60%, respectively, of the oﬀered
courses had to be canceled shortly because of an insuﬃcient number of participants
(Paulsen et al., 2006).
To sum up, the allocation of unemployed to training programs largely depends on
short-term criteria as well as private information of the caseworker. The unemployed
typically does not know the starting date of a program in advance. In the following
empirical analysis, we will exploit this feature of the assignment process for the
identiﬁcation of dynamic treatment eﬀects.
8About 13% of the long-term training programs in our analysis sample start on or after the ﬁrst
of January 2003.
73 Conceptual Considerations
Why are treatments taken at diﬀerent points in time not just a version of multiple
treatments? Why look at unemployment and employment durations as outcomes?
In order to clarify these questions, this section brieﬂy outlines the concept of dynamic
program assignment and the selection issues involved. Further, we explain in what
respect an explicitly dynamic framework that also models outcomes in a dynamic
way allows one to obtain additional insights in how active labor market programs
work.
Consider ﬁrst the following stylized institutional setup. Individuals dynamically
move between the two labor market states unemployment and employment. While
unemployed, they may be assigned to an active labor market program. In par-
ticular, the job-seeker and the caseworker at the local employment agency meet
repeatedly during the unemployment spell. At any such occasion, the caseworker
decides whether to assign his client to a program or to postpone participation to the
future, waiting further how job search evolves. Somebody who has not participated,
say, until day 80 of his unemployment spell may still enrol later. If, however, he
starts a new job at day 81 he would not be eligible for participation anymore.
The above example is not speciﬁc to this paper but such an assignment process
is indeed typical for many countries with comprehensive systems of ongoing labor
market programs (cf. section 2.2 on Germany or Sianesi, 2004, on Sweden). Sim-
ilar situations may also arise in social experiments: Assume as before that only
unemployed individuals are eligible for treatment. At some baseline point in time
unemployed individuals are randomly assigned to a treatment and control group,
but the number of individuals in the treatment group exceeds the number of in-
stantly available program slots.9 In this case, randomization does only hold for the
intention to treat but not for receiving treatment because those individuals in the
treatment group starting a program at a later point in time are those who were
unsuccessful in ﬁnding a job in the meantime.
These generic examples illustrate that program participation is often the result of
a dynamic process that is linked to another dynamic process, here unemployment,
that in turn is related to economic outcomes of interest in an evaluation study, e.g.
9Heckman et al. (1999) report that in several major social experiments conducted in the US,
such as for the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), randomization could only be achieved with
respect to the intention to treat. Because of time gaps between randomization and program start
30 to 50% of the individuals in the treatment group dropped out of the experiment before actually
receiving treatment.
8employment status or wages. In order to avoid an implicit conditioning on future
outcomes when deﬁning treatment and control group status, it is thus important to
properly account for the dynamic nature of program participation (see Fredriksson
and Johansson, 2008, for a formal analysis). In an empirical analysis, this can easily
be done by using a time varying indicator for treatment status. If, for instance,
one wants to study the eﬀect of an active labor market program on the probability
to leave unemployment, one would include a time varying dummy variable equal
to one once the program has started. The coeﬃcient on this variable would then
correspond to the treatment eﬀect.
But what about nonrandom selection into programs? In order to illustrate the addi-
tional selection issues at play in a dynamic setup, abstract from selection bias due to
observed and unobserved diﬀerences across treatment and control group and focus
on selection across time. In particular, consider the case that randomization into
treatment occurs sequentially at diﬀerent points in time for a given cohort of indi-
viduals who survive in unemployment until that time.10 At any given randomization
date a fraction of those still unemployed at that date are randomly selected for par-
ticipation in a program that starts immediately. Those individuals not receiving
treatment at that day may be randomized into treatment at a later date. Thus, a
comparison of outcomes between those treated at a given day and those not treated
at that day would yield the eﬀect of being treated now versus possibly later (i.e. the
eﬀect of treatment versus waiting).11 However, with sequential randomization one
cannot identify the eﬀect of being treated at some later date versus at an earlier
date for those who survive until the later date. In fact, if the treatment increases
the probability of leaving unemployment, those already treated at an earlier date
but still unemployed at the later date are a more negatively selected group than
those untreated until the later date. Furthermore, treatment eﬀects associated with
diﬀerent starting dates are estimated from the changing population of survivors at
each date and are therefore not comparable across starting dates. This also means
that one cannot causally compare treatment eﬀects associated with diﬀerent start-
10Sequential matching techniques mimic a sequential randomization into treatment. Applications
include Sianesi (2004, 2008), Dyke et al. (2006), Lechner and Wiehler (2007) or Fitzenberger et
al. (2008). Biewen et al. (2007) use such an approach to evaluate the diﬀerent training schemes
administered in the context of German active labor market policy.
11Crépon et al. (2009) consider a setup that corresponds to a slightly diﬀerent randomization
protocol than the one described here. At a given randomization date t treatment starting dates ts
are drawn for each individual still unemployed at that date, such that fts : ts ¸ tg. In this setting,
it is possible to identify the eﬀect of treatment at t = ts versus no treatment on the probability
of survival in unemployment for those who are still unemployed at t because the randomization
protocol implies that those receiving treatment at t > ts randomly drop out of the control group
at their future treatment start.
9ing dates. In order to causally analyze the eﬀect of receiving treatment at diﬀerent
points in time, one needs to devise a model for the selection into diﬀerent labor mar-
ket states and treatment over time. Event history models provide an appropriate
framework to model a dynamic evaluation problem. With rich enough data they
allow a ﬂexible modeling of the dynamic selection into treatment that may be based
on observables as well as unobservables, under minimal or no parametric assump-
tions. Furthermore, they would also allow to pursue a fully structural analysis based
on economic search theory.
There is an important additional beneﬁt to using a duration framework. It allows
one to analyze the separate impact of a program on unemployment and employment
spells.12 This is important in order to learn how a program generates a certain eﬀect
on the employment rate. A higher employment rate can be due to the treatment
increasing the exit rate out of unemployment or decreasing the exit rate out of
employment or both. This distinction is not possible with employment rates even
if individuals are randomly assigned into treatment and control groups at some
baseline point in time, because the composition of those in employment at a given
later point in time depends on the treatment status, unless the treatment eﬀect is
zero. In fact, if the treatment increases the probability to leave unemployment, then
the individuals in the treatment group who have experienced at least one transition
to employment at a given point in time after treatment are a more negatively selected
subgroup than those from the control group, as the treatment helps unemployed with
otherwise low reemployment chances to get a job.13
4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Identiﬁcation
Our evaluation approach builds on the timing-of-events framework by Abbring and
van den Berg (2003a).14 They consider a continuous time duration model where the
transition rates from untreated unemployment into program participation and into
12Bergemann et al. (2008) study the eﬀects of training on the outcome states employment
and non-employment. They combine propensity score matching with a conditional diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach where the non-employment and the employment hazard are speciﬁed as
linear probability models. However, this approach does not allow them to model the dynamic
selection into the diﬀerent outcome states, but is conditional on being in a given state.
13See Ham and LaLonde (1996) for a detailed illustration of this point.
14Abbring and Heckman (2007) contains an overview over diﬀerent approaches to the evaluation
of dynamic treatment eﬀects.
10employment are jointly modeled as two competing risks. Extending the literature
on dependent competing risks models, they show that the causal eﬀect of entering
a program can be identiﬁed semi-parametrically from single spell data with time
constant regressors.
The timing-of-events approach exploits variation in the timing of treatment in order
to identify causal treatment eﬀects. Intuitively this approach works as follows. The
realization of a treatment date is only observed if an individual is still in open, i.e.
untreated, unemployment by that time. Otherwise the duration until program start
is censored at the moment in which the individual exits to employment. Similarly,
the realization of the time spent in untreated unemployment is only observed if an
individual exits to employment before being assigned to a program. Otherwise the
duration in untreated unemployment with destination employment is censored at the
moment in which the individual enrols into the program. Thus, until treatment start,
treatment and outcome process – i.e. the waiting times in untreated unemployment
until program start and until employment, respectively – are two competing risks
and identiﬁcation results known from the literature on competing risks models can
be applied.15 In particular, dynamic selection into treatment based on unobservables
can be modeled by allowing for a nonzero correlation between the unobservables of
the two risks. In a next step, the treatment eﬀect can be traced out as the diﬀerential
dependence between treatment and outcome process arising after the program has
started. This amounts to comparing the realization of the total unemployment
duration until exit to employment of individuals who enroled in a program at a
given point in time during their unemployment spell with that of individuals who
did not (yet) enrol at that point in time. Individuals enroling at some later point in
time contribute to the non-treatment outcome up to their own program start. Their
duration in untreated unemployment with destination employment is censored when
their program starts.
In this paper, we consider an extended version of the framework described above. We
model the dynamic assignment process of two treatments, i.e. short-term and long-
term training. We consider the impacts of training on the ongoing unemployment
spell and the subsequent employment spell and allow for heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects that are a function of observed covariates and unobserved heterogeneity.16
15See Heckman and Honoré (1989) and Lancaster (1990) on the main identiﬁcation results for
competing risks models.
16Formal identiﬁcation proofs for these extensions can be found in Abbring (2006, Proposition
1) on the multiple competing risks and multiple treatment model, Crépon et al. (2005) on a model
including treatment eﬀects on subsequent employment duration, and Abbring and van den Berg
(2003a) and Richardson and van den Berg (2006) on heterogeneous treatment eﬀects.
11Moreover, we have access to particularly rich data containing time-varying regressors
and repeated spells per individual, such that our estimated model is identiﬁed under
much weaker assumptions than a more basic model with time constant covariates
and single spell data.
In the timing-of-events framework, treatment assignment is conceived as a dynamic
stochastic process. This requires ﬁrst that there is suﬃcient variation of program
starts over elapsed unemployment duration. This can be veriﬁed by plotting the
distribution of program starts in the data. In section 5.2, we present evidence
that starting dates of programs do vary over elapsed unemployment duration in
our data. Second, at the individual level, program assignment needs to have a
random component that remains after conditioning on elapsed time, observable and
unobservable variables in the model. This holds if the exact treatment date is
not known in advance by the potential participants.17 This requirement has to be
substantiated by the institutional circumstances that lead to program participation.
As discussed in section 2.2, the institutional setting underlying this analysis is such
that the allocation of unemployed to training programs is determined by short-
term supply factors that are beyond the control of the unemployed and unknown
to him (e.g. short-term allocation decisions of the caseworker aiming to ensure a
high capacity utilization, or whether the number of other participants in a chosen
course exceeds a critical threshold for the course to take place). The job-seeker
learns about his participation only very shortly before or at the actual start of the
program. Moreover, job-seekers are encouraged to continue searching for a new
job at any time, even while they are participating in a program. There is also no
evidence for Germany that job-seekers systematically like or dislike (the idea of)
participating in a training program. Therefore, we are convinced that the so called
‘no-anticipation’ assumption holds in our analysis.
The basic version of the timing-of-events model by Abbring and van den Berg
(2003a) imposes two important functional form restrictions: (i) a proportional struc-
ture of the hazards, where dependence on elapsed time, observed covariates and
unobserved heterogeneity enter the speciﬁcation multiplicatively,18 and (ii) indepen-
dence between observed covariates and unobserved heterogeneity terms. However,
in our study these assumptions are not crucial for identiﬁcation because our data
17This does however allow for the possibility that the job-seeker knows that he has a low or high
probability of entering a program and adjusts his search behavior accordingly. This is commonly
referred to as the ex ante treatment eﬀect. Our analysis focuses on ex post treatment eﬀects
though.
18Within each of the multiplicative components, no parametric functional form restrictions need
to be imposed.
12situation is more favorable than in the baseline case of single spell data and time
constant covariates.
Assumption (i) of proportionality can be relaxed if the set of conditioning variables
includes time-varying regressors, as they provide additional exogenous variation
generally facilitating identiﬁcation (Heckman and Taber, 1994, McCall, 1996, and
Brinch, 2007).19 In particular, Brinch (2007) establishes that, if the model includes
covariates that vary over time and across observations, the dependence of the hazard
on elapsed time and observed regressors is nonparametrically identiﬁed. Thus, only
separability between observed and unobserved components is needed. The intuition
for this is as follows. Variation of covariates over time provides exclusion restrictions
in the sense that, if one assumes that the current hazard depends only on current
values of the regressors, then any observed dependence of the survival probability
on past regressor values comes through the unobserved heterogeneity (Brinch, 2007,
Eberwein et al., 1997). In this paper, we include several time-varying regressors in
each of the four hazard rates we model. For instance, the hazard rate from unem-
ployment to employment includes dummy variables indicating the closeness to the
expected expiration date of unemployment beneﬁts, dummies indicating the diﬀer-
ent seasons of the year, and for the treatment eﬀects dummy variables indicating
diﬀerent time intervals before and after the planned end date of the program.20
Furthermore, neither assumption (i) nor (ii) need to be imposed with multi-spell
data, i.e. multiple observations within individual and spell type. The mixed propor-
tional structure of the hazards can be relaxed and independence between observed
and unobserved determinants is not required anymore, provided that the unobserved
components are constant across spells of a given type and a given individual (Ab-
bring and van den Berg, 2003a). In fact, identiﬁcation does not depend on the
variation of the hazards with observed covariates anymore, but exploits the varia-
tion of the durations within individual and spell type, similar to ﬁxed eﬀects panel
data models (Abbring and van den Berg, 2004).21 In this paper, we use multiple
unemployment-employment cycles per individual. About half of the individuals in
19Without time-varying regressors one additionally needs ﬁniteness of the mean of the unob-
servables or an assumption on the tail of their distribution for identiﬁcation (Heckman and Taber,
1994).
20See Appendix C for a detailed description of the regressors used.
21Formal proofs for the case of multi-spell data on a single risk or two competing risks can be
found in Honoré (1993) and Abbring and van den Berg (2003a, b), respectively. The extension to
the case of multi-spell multiple competing risks is obtained by repeatedly applying the identiﬁcation
results for the bivariate case (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b). Abbring (2006, Proposition
3) discusses identiﬁcation in the more general case when the distribution of initial states is not
degenerate.
13the sample experience two or more unemployment spells and about a third has two
or more employment spells. Taken together, these data features enhance the robust-
ness and credibility of our estimation results because identiﬁcation does not rely on
the functional form assumptions required in the basic model with single spell data
and time constant covariates.
Multivariate duration models do not require formal exclusion restrictions, but only
independent variation of the diﬀerent hazard rates with the regressors. In our ap-
plication this requirement should be fulﬁlled easily since the four hazard rates we
model represent conceptually distinct labor market states and destinations. Further-
more, we consider a very large set of covariates reﬂecting many diﬀerent individual
and job characteristics, caseworker assessments and the inﬂuence of calendar time.
Empirically, we ﬁnd that some regressors are signiﬁcant in some equations but not
in others. This suggests that there is suﬃcient independent variation in the regres-
sor eﬀects across equations, which is important in order to identify the dependency
structure of the diﬀerent risks.
4.2 Modeling the Hazard Rates
For an inﬂow sample into unemployment, we model the hazard rates from unemploy-
ment to employment and to training as well as from employment to unemployment.
Two diﬀerent types of training programs are considered: short-term training (ST)
and long-term training (LT). If an individual experiences multiple unemployment
or employment spells throughout the observation period, all of them are retained.
Analysis time is measured in days.
Let x(t) denote a row-vector of observed time constant as well as time-varying co-
variates, ¯k the parameter vector of spell type k; k = 1;:::;4, vk the unobserved
heterogeneity term, and ¸k(t) the baseline hazard. The conditional transition inten-
sities for the waiting times until the start of the two training programs are then:
µk(tjx(t);vk) = ¸k(t) ¢ exp(x(t)¯k) ¢ vk; k = 2; 3:
Similarly, the hazard rate from unemployment to employment is:
µ1(tjx(t);v1) = ¸1(t) ¢ exp(x(t)¯1) ¢
3 Y
p=2
exp[±p(¦) ¢ 1(t ¸ t
n
p;P = p)] ¢ v1
where the function ±p(¦) corresponds to the treatment eﬀect of participating in train-
ing type p = ST; LT and 1(¦) is the indicator function that is equal to one from
14the beginning of program P = p onwards. The treatment eﬀect is modeled as a
function of elapsed unemployment duration t, elapsed unemployment duration at
program start tn
p, planned program duration tx
p, observed covariates and unobserved
heterogeneity, i.e. ±p(¦) = ±p(t;tn
p;tx
p;x;v±p).
Finally, the hazard rate while employed equals:
µ4(tjx(t);v4) = ¸4(t) ¢ exp(x(t)¯4) ¢
3 Y
k=2
exp[°p(¦) ¢ 1(P = p)] ¢ v4
where °p(¦) is the treatment eﬀect. Analogously to the unemployment hazard, °p(¦)
is a function of observed covariates and unobservables, i.e. °p(¦) = °p(x;v°p).
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4.3 Modeling Unobserved Heterogeneity
In order to avoid functional form assumptions on the joint distribution of the un-
observables, it is common to model the unobserved terms as a discrete masspoint
distribution that in principle allows to approximate any arbitrary discrete or contin-
uous distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). In particular, we adopt a two-factor
loading model where the two underlying factors, w1 and w2, are assumed to be
independent:
vm = exp(®m1 w1 + ®m2 w2); m = 1;:::;4;±ST;±LT;°ST;°LT;
where the indices m = 1;:::;4 correspond to the four hazards and the indices
m = ±ST;±LT;°ST;°LT to the treatment eﬀects of short- and long-term train-
ing on the unemployment and the employment hazard, respectively. Each of the
two factors follows a discrete distribution with two masspoints.22 This speciﬁca-
22Neither the latent factors nor their (number of) masspoints should be given a concrete inter-
pretation. The latent factors just represent one dimensional indexes of model determinants that
are unobserved by the econometrician and therefore not precisely known. Monte Carlo evidence
presented in Heckman and Singer (1984) and Gaure et al. (2007) suggests that the interpretation
should rather focus on summary measures of the distribution of unobservables such as the mean,
the variance or correlations. Further, Heckman and Singer (1984) suggest that a relatively small
number of support points for the unobserved heterogeneity terms suﬃces to get reliable estimates
of the parameters of the observed determinants and to produce accurate predictions of the duration
distributions.
15tion has the advantage that, while maintaining computational tractability, it im-
poses no restrictions on the covariance matrix of the four unobserved heterogene-
ity terms. Let w = (w1;w2)0 and A be the matrix of factor loadings with rows
Am = (®m1; ®m2); m = 1;:::;4;±ST;±LT;°ST;°LT. Then the variance-covariance
matrix of the unobserved heterogeneity terms is given by Var(ln(v)) = AVar(w)A0.
Such a factor loading speciﬁcation requires some normalization in order to be iden-
tiﬁed. We normalize the two fundamental factors to have support on f¡1;1g and
in addition constrain ®22 to equal zero.23
4.4 The Likelihood Function
Conditional on the observed covariates and the unobserved determinants, the joint











where Nik is the number of spells that individual i spends in state k, tijk is the
time spent in the jth observation period in state k, and cijk is a censoring indicator
that equals one if the jth observation period in state k ends with a transition.
Since we allow for nonzero correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the
four transition intensities and the treatment eﬀects, the likelihood function is not
separable by individual and spell type but only at the individual level. Thus, the
individual likelihood contribution conditional on observed covariates and integrated













In order to determine suitable speciﬁcations for the four hazard rates, ﬁrst a univari-
ate mixed proportional hazards model, with unobserved heterogeneity modeled as a
discrete masspoint distribution, is ﬁtted for each. Starting values for the coeﬃcients
are chosen based on an iterative procedure. First, a piecewise constant exponen-
tial model without unobserved heterogeneity is ﬁtted. Then, starting values for the
23Note that all hazards contain an intercept.
24In order to simplify the notation the treatment eﬀects and the corresponding unobserved
heterogeneity terms are kept implicit in the following.
16parameters involving the mixing distribution are determined through a grid search.
The parameter vector yielding the highest log likelihood is retained as initial vec-
tor for the ﬁnal optimization that uses a modiﬁed Newton-Raphson algorithm with
analytic ﬁrst and second derivatives.25 The covariates and their functional forms
are chosen separately for each hazard based on single and joint signiﬁcance and the
value of the log likelihood function. The width and number of intervals for the base-
line hazards vary over the four hazards as well. They are selected according to the
shape of Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rates and additional criteria such as
signiﬁcance. Finally, starting from the optimal speciﬁcations for the single hazards,
the multivariate mixed proportional hazards model is estimated also using a mod-
iﬁed Newton-Raphson algorithm with analytic ﬁrst and second derivatives.26 The
ﬁnal speciﬁcations presented in section 6 involve the estimation of 355 parameters.
5 Data
5.1 Analysis Sample
The empirical analysis is based on an exceptionally rich administrative database, the
German Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS), that has recently been
made available by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment
Agency. The IEBS is a 2.2% random sample from a merged data ﬁle containing
individual records out of four diﬀerent administrative registers.27 It comprises data
on employment subject to social security contributions, receipt of transfer payments
during unemployment, job search, and participation in diﬀerent active labor market
programs. The basic population consists of all individuals who, during the period
1990 to mid-2005, have either held a job subject to social security contributions or
have been registered as a beneﬁt recipient, job searcher, or program participant at
an employment agency. The data are constructed as an event history data set with
start and end dates measured on a daily basis. An important feature of the data is
that it contains parallel spells in the case of overlapping states. This allows us e.g.
to distinguish regular employment from employment spells in the context of active
labor market policy. Moreover, the IEBS comprises a large set of variables that give
a detailed picture of socio-economic, occupational and job characteristics, as well as
25The use of analytic derivatives considerably speeds up the estimation that – in spite of the
large data size and the great variety of covariates considered – altogether takes only a couple of
minutes per run.
26All the estimations were carried out with Stata MP Version 9 and its matrix language Mata.
27See Appendix B for further details.
17of job search and contents of active labor market programs.
From this data set, we extract a sample of West German individuals aged 25 to 53
who experience a transition from regular, unsubsidized employment lasting three
months or more to unemployment within the period July 1999 to December 2001.
Unemployment is deﬁned as non-employment with at least occasional contact with
the employment agency that may consist either in receipt of some kind of unemploy-
ment compensation, a job search spell, or program participation. Unemployment
spells are censored at the end date of the last contact with the employment agency
if in the following three months no such contact persists. Transitions to active labor
market programs other than training are also treated as independent censoring.
We consider two types of training programs: short-term training (ST) and tradi-
tional long-term training (LT). Thus, an untreated unemployed is exposed to three
diﬀerent risks: being assigned to a short-term training scheme (spell type unem-
ployment, UE, to ST) or a long-term training program (spell type UE to LT) or
ﬁnding a new job (spell type UE to employment, EM). Until the realization of the
ﬁrst transition this corresponds to a competing risks model with three destination
states. However, unlike in a standard competing risks model, the two other risks are
not in all cases censored at the realization of the ﬁrst transition. A participation in
training aﬀects the exit rate to employment from the start of the program onwards.
If no transition towards training occurs before the termination of the unemploy-
ment spell – either due to a transition to employment or because of censoring – then
the waiting times until short-term training and long-term training are treated as
censored at the termination date of the unemployment spell. If a transition from
unemployment towards long-term training occurs ﬁrst, then the waiting time un-
til short-term training is treated as censored at the time of entry into long-term
training. However, the waiting time until long-term training is not censored if the
transition to short-term training occurs ﬁrst. Instead, it is allowed to change from
the start of the short-term training program onwards. This asymmetry between
short-term and long-term training is motivated by the fact that short-term training
is also used to assess the professional skills of an unemployed and to deﬁne a suitable
reintegration plan, which may entail participation in a long-term training program.28
In contrast, the probability that an unemployed who has already participated in a
long-term training scheme is referred to an additional program is very small.
In addition, we model the subsequent employment duration (spell type EM to UE)
28In the sample, about 9% of the participants in short-term training later on enrol in traditional
further training.
18in order to study how it is aﬀected by a participation in training during the previous
unemployment spell. Individuals in the sample may have multiple unemployment
and employment spells if they experience multiple transitions between unemploy-
ment and employment. Each unemployment-employment cycle has the structure
described above. A treatment is assumed to aﬀect only the ongoing unemployment
spell and the directly following employment spell. Thus regarding earlier treatments,
the model speciﬁcation rules out lagged occurrence dependence in the unemployment
spell and higher order lagged occurrence dependence in the employment spell. The
observation period lasts until the end of December 2004, and ongoing spells are
censored at that date.
5.2 Descriptive Analysis
Overall the sample consists of 45,420 individuals and 326,608 spells. Tables 1 and 2
below give further details. There are 8,485 transitions into short-term training and
5,388 transitions into long-term training (cf. table 1). Table 2 shows that about half
of the individuals in the sample experience multiple unemployment spells and about
a third have more than one employment spell.
— Insert table 1 here. —
— Insert table 2 here. —
Figure 1 displays the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the probability to start a program
at some given day in elapsed unemployment conditional on survival in untreated
unemployment until that date. It can be seen that the daily hazard rate into short-
term training varies between 0.015 and 0.056% and that of long-term training lies
between 0.003 and 0.037%.
— Insert ﬁgure 1 here. —
We also calculate Kaplan-Meier estimates of the probability to survive in unem-
ployment and employment, respectively, beyond the elapsed duration given on the
abscissa by treatment status. These survivor functions are given in ﬁgure 2. These
estimates do not correct for selection on observables or unobservables. Treatment
status during unemployment is a time-varying variable meaning that future partic-
ipants contribute to the non-treated survivor function until they start training. In
the left panel of ﬁgure 2, it can be seen that the curve for the treated with long-term
19training lies above the one for the non-treated and that the area between the two
lines has the shape of a lens. This suggests that initially individuals enroling into
long-term training leave unemployment at a slower rate than non-treated individu-
als, which is reﬂected in a widening of the vertical distance between the two curves.
As the share of treated who have completed their training program increases with
elapsed unemployment duration the vertical distance between the curves narrows
again, meaning that treated individuals now leave unemployment at a faster rate
than non-treated. For short-term training there is no such strong evidence for a
lock-in eﬀect. Even at short elapsed unemployment durations the survivor functions
of participants in short-term training and non-treated are very close. At higher
elapsed durations, the fraction of treated with short-term training still unemployed
is clearly smaller than that of non-treated or treated with long-term training.
— Insert ﬁgure 2 here. —
The right panel of ﬁgure 2 shows the survivor functions in employment by treatment
status in the preceding unemployment spell. At short elapsed durations, individuals
treated with short-term training exit employment at a faster rate than non-treated
or former participants in long-term training. The latter have the most stable em-
ployment relationships. In fact, the vertical distance to the survivor functions of
treated with short-term training and non-treated ﬁrst increases and then remains
largely stable at higher elapsed durations. The descriptive analysis thus suggests
that long-term training may have a positive eﬀect on employment duration but at
the same time seems to strongly increase unemployment duration. Short-term train-
ing, in contrast, tends to reduce unemployment duration but seems to lead to smaller
gains in employment duration than long-term training. However, it is important to
stress that these patterns reﬂect a mixture of causal and selection eﬀects. It remains
to be seen to what extent they persist after accounting for selection into treatments
and into employment and unemployment over time.
Turning again to the dynamics of treatment eﬀects during unemployment, we also
computed the hazard rate out of unemployment based on estimates of the Kaplan-
Meier survivor function. The left panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the hazard rate obtained
using the total population of entrants into unemployment, whereby those starting
short-term training or long-term training within the ﬁrst 182 days of unemployment
are classiﬁed as treated from the moment of program start onwards. Those entering
later are censored at the entry into program. The right panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the
hazard rate estimated on the subset of individuals surviving at least 365 days in
20open unemployment. This time individuals beginning a training program between
day 365 and 547 of unemployment are classiﬁed as treated from the moment of
program start onwards. Those entering from day 548 onwards are again censored
at the moment of program start. In particular, comparing the ﬁgure on the right
to that on the left, it seems that the lock-in eﬀect, i.e. the initial reduction of the
hazard rate of participants relative to nonparticipants, is completely absent for par-
ticipants in short-term training and less pronounced for those in long-term training.
Also, the post-participation increase of the hazard rate for former participants of
long-term training seems to be higher in the right ﬁgure. On a purely descriptive
basis, however, one cannot tell whether this evidence can indeed be interpreted as
dynamic variation of treatment eﬀects with starting date. In fact, the population of
individuals surviving until day 365 is likely systematically diﬀerent from the total
population starting an unemployment spell, and in addition selection into treatment
may change over time.
— Insert ﬁgure 3 here. —
6 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst present the treatment eﬀects of short-term and long-term
training on the exit rates out of unemployment and employment. In a next step,
we look at how these instantaneous eﬀects translate into changes in the expected
unemployment and employment duration.29
6.1 Instantaneous Impacts of Training on the Hazard Rates
Treatment eﬀects during unemployment are modeled as a function of elapsed un-
employment duration at program start tn
p, p = ST; LT, elapsed time since program
start, tp, planned program duration, tx
p, individual characteristics such as age and
gender, and unobserved heterogeneity.30 The treatment eﬀects during employment
are modeled using indicators of training status in the preceding unemployment spell,
29The complete estimation results are given in table D1, column 3, in Appendix D. The lower
panel of table D2 in Appendix D contains the correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms
in the four hazards and the treatment eﬀects. Table C1 in Appendix C contains the variable
descriptions.
30Unobserved heterogeneity is modeled as a two-factor loading speciﬁcation composed of two
independent factors. Each latent factor follows a discrete masspoint distribution with support
f¡1;1g.
21one for short-term and one for long-term training, and interactions of these variables
with individual characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity.31 The estimated coef-
ﬁcients associated with the treatment eﬀects are displayed in table 3.
— Insert table 3 about here. —
Duration Dependence Patterns of Treatment Eﬀects
The evidence contained in section 5.2 as well as previous evaluations of training
programs suggests that treatment eﬀects vary with elapsed time since program start.
During participation, participants typically search less intensively for a new job
than comparable nonparticipants. Thus, one would expect to ﬁnd a lower exit rate
to employment for participants in training at least in the short run. In order to
allow for duration dependent treatment eﬀects in an event history framework, it
is common to model treatment eﬀects as a function of elapsed time since program
start. However, if program durations vary across participants, it is impossible to
infer precisely how search behavior changes during and after program participation
based on this approach. Therefore, we model the duration dependence of treatment
eﬀects using time relative to the planned program end. In particular, we introduce
time-varying dummies indicating diﬀerent time intervals before and after expected
program completion. The time intervals have been selected through a speciﬁcation
search that sequentially aggregated intervals where no or only little variation of the
treatment eﬀect was found. For short-term training we found some of these dummies
interacted with gender to be signiﬁcant.
In order to simplify the interpretation, ﬁgure 4 graphically illustrates the duration
dependence patterns of the treatment eﬀects on the hazard rate out of unemployment
for a hypothetical person with all individual characteristics set to the reference
category, and unobserved heterogeneity terms set to the mean.32 The ﬁgure conﬁrms
the hypothesis that participation reduces search intensity when the scheduled end
of the program is still far ahead. For short-term training the hazard rate of the
hypothetical person is reduced by 43% when the planned end lies more than 15
days ahead. For the hypothetical participant in long-term training expecting to
31We also estimated a model that included interaction eﬀects indicating a participation in both
short-term and long-term training. However, these terms were not signiﬁcant neither in the unem-
ployment nor the employment hazard.
32The reference category is male, German, aged 38, no disability or health constraints, educa-
tional degree diﬀerent than vocational education, long-term training starting at day 110 of unem-
ployment. The percentage values of the treatment eﬀects are obtained by applying (exp(¦)¡1)¢100
to the values given in table 3.
22complete his program in more than 360 days, the search intensity decreases by 94%.
The hazard rates of participants recover towards the planned program end and
exceed that of comparable non-participants shortly before and after the scheduled
program completion date. For the hypothetical participant in short-term training
the treatment eﬀect peaks at 86% within the ﬁrst month after expected program
completion and for the hypothetical participant in long-term training it reaches a
maximum of 113% within the ﬁrst three months after expected program completion.
While the positive impact of short-term training fades away very quickly, that of
long-term training is much more lasting, turning zero only one and a half years after
the scheduled program end for the hypothetical person depicted in ﬁgure 4. Finally,
note that both programs reduce the exit rate out of subsequent employment for the
hypothetical person considered here. The reduction is 12% for short-term training
and 17% for long-term training (see table 3).
— Insert ﬁgure 4 about here. —
Heterogeneity of Treatment Eﬀects Across Individual Characteristics
Table D1 in Appendix D includes estimation results for a speciﬁcation that excludes
unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀects (column 2 of table D1). The log-
likelihood for that model is ¡840;349:68, whereas the log-likelihood of our preferred
speciﬁcation, that includes eight additional parameters for the unobservables in the
treatment eﬀects, is ¡840;321:05 (column 3 of table D1). This suggests that unob-
served heterogeneity is an important feature of the treatment eﬀects. Furthermore,
there are interesting diﬀerences in treatment eﬀects across observed characteristics
of the participants. We ﬁnd for long-term training programs that treatment eﬀects
increase with elapsed time at program start (cf. the terms involving ln(tn
LT) in the
right column of table 3).
The eﬀect of long-term training is signiﬁcantly larger in absolute terms for women
than for men. Women participating in long-term training have a (exp(:2)¡1)¢100 =
22 percentage points higher exit rate out of unemployment and a twelve percentage
points lower exit rate out of employment than male participants. Regarding short-
term training, the lock-in eﬀect is somewhat more pronounced for female compared
to male participants. The short-run impact on the exit rate to work immediately
after the expected program end is lower for women than men, but the medium- to
long-run impact is higher. As regards the exit rate out of employment, there are no
signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the treatment eﬀect for short-term training. Female
participants in long-term training exhibit a 12 percentage points lower exit rate out
23of employment than otherwise identical male participants.
Treatment eﬀects during unemployment vary also across age. The treatment eﬀect
of long-term training exhibits a concave proﬁle across age. The turning point is
at age 30. This means that older participants beneﬁt less from human capital
oriented training when the outcome is unemployment duration. As regards the age
eﬀects of short-term training, there is some evidence for a concave proﬁle for the
unemployment hazard as well. There is no evidence for heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects across age on the exit rate out of employment. Thus, once employed there
are no diﬀerences in treatment eﬀects for individuals of a diﬀerent age.
Disabled persons beneﬁt particularly from short-term training, while individuals
with health constraints fare better with long-term training than with short-term
training. In particular, former trainees in short-term training who faced strong
health constraints during their job search have a higher exit rate out of employment
than trainees with no health problems. The exit rate out of employment is 69
percentage points higher for somebody treated with short-term training who had
health constraints aﬀecting placement.
Either training program is more beneﬁcial to foreigners compared to Germans when
the outcome is the exit rate to work. Foreigners participating in short-term training
have a 10 percentage points higher escape rate out of unemployment than their
German counterparts. Individuals treated with human capital oriented training
holding a foreign nationality have a 19 percentage points higher unemployment
hazard than German participants. This suggests that training schemes that improve
search eﬃciency and provide signals to employers in form of accredited certiﬁcates
are particularly eﬀective to reintegrate foreigners back into employment. However,
having a foreign nationality tends to oﬀset the employment prolonging eﬀect of
long-term training. Finally, there is only little eﬀect heterogeneity across formal
educational degrees when the outcome is unemployment, and no eﬀect heterogeneity
when the outcome is employment.
6.2 Impacts on Unemployment and Employment Duration
and the Timing of Treatment
So far, we have focused on the instantaneous impacts of training on the hazard
rates out of unemployment and employment. Another way to analyze treatment
eﬀects in an event history framework is to examine the expected unemployment
duration by treatment status as a function of elapsed unemployment duration at
24treatment start.33 This allows us to study how the treatment eﬀects accumulate
over time and how these accumulated eﬀects depend on the starting date. Likewise,
one can compute the expected employment duration according to the treatment
status in the previous unemployment spell. Contrasting expected unemployment
and employment durations allows us to compare short-run and long-run impacts of
program participation.34
In the following, we focus on the truncated expectation and present results for three
diﬀerent truncation points. With time-varying covariates and piecewise constant
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where fx(t)g denotes the entire covariate process including the baseline hazard
and treatment eﬀect, x(td) refers to the covariate process until the beginning of
time interval d, d = 1;:::;D, and v represents the unobserved heterogeneity
terms aﬀecting unemployment duration and the treatment eﬀects. S1(tjx(t);v) =
exp[¡
R t
0 µ1(¿jx(¿);v)d¿] is the survivor function. tD denotes the maximum du-
ration until which integration is to be performed. Here, we set tD in turn to
1826 days (= ﬁve years), 3653 days (=10 years), and 7305 days (=20 years).
The time horizon of ﬁve years reﬂects a conservative choice that lies within the
support of our data, whereas the truncation points of 10 and 20 years extrapo-
late beyond the sampling frame. The truncated expected employment duration,
E[T4jfx(t)g;v;T4 · tD], is computed analogously. Furthermore, we consider the
median of the nontruncated distribution of employment spells. The median du-
ration ft : S4(t) = 0:5g is calculated as follows: Determine the time interval d
for which S4(td¡1) ¸ 0:5 > S4(td) and solve 0:5 = S4(td¡1)exp[¡
R t
td¡1 µ4(¿)d¿] for
t. This yields t = ln[0:5=S(td¡1)]=µ4;d + td¡1, where µ4;d denotes the hazard rate
evaluated at the covariate and baseline hazard values in time interval d.
In order to evaluate the mean and median outcome durations, the covariates are set
to the values of a ﬁctitious, but representative person in the inﬂow sample. Speciﬁ-
cally, we assume that this person is a German aged 38 at the start of unemployment
33We consider the unconditional expectation that does not condition on remaining unemployed
until the program starting date under consideration.
34Eberwein et al. (2002) give an overview of diﬀerent possibilities to describe treatment eﬀects
in duration models. See also Lancaster (1990, ch. 1 and 5).
25and 39 at the beginning of employment, married with children, living in the Ger-
man federal states of Hesse, holding the highest high school degree (Abitur) and
a vocational training degree, previously employed as a whitecollar service worker,
with a salary in the third quartile, entitled to twelve months of unemployment ben-
eﬁts, considered as having relevant vocational qualiﬁcation by the caseworker, and
starting his or her unemployment spell in the ﬁrst quarter of the year 2000 and the
employment spell one year later.35 The planned program durations are set to 26
and 245 days for short-term and long-term training, respectively. The unobserved
heterogeneity terms are set to their mean values. The expected unemployment and
employment duration are then computed for a man and a woman with the above
mentioned characteristics.
Figure 5 depicts the truncated expected unemployment duration according to the
treatment status and the waiting time until program start. The top panel assumes a
time horizon of ﬁve years, the middle panel of ten years, and the bottom panel of 20
years. The left column refers to the representative man, the right to the woman. In
each graph, the vertical distance between two curves corresponds to the treatment
eﬀect in terms of the diﬀerence in the expected unemployment duration. Consider
e.g. the top left graph of ﬁgure 5. The representative man stays on average 224 days
in unemployment when not participating in a training program. Equivalently, this
number can be interpreted as the expected unemployment duration that would arise
if he participates in training at some given starting date plotted on the abscissae
but the treatment eﬀect is hypothetically set to zero. The vertical distance between
the “No-training”-line and the line referring to short-term training (ST) measures
the reduction in average unemployment duration that can be achieved through a
participation in short-term training starting at some given day of unemployment
plotted on the abscissae. Similarly, the vertical distance between the line referring
to long-term training (LT) and the “No-training”-line shows the diﬀerence in ex-
pected unemployment duration associated with participation in long-term training
compared to nonparticipation.
— Insert ﬁgure 5 about here. —
A comparison of the diﬀerent rows of ﬁgure 5 shows a stable pattern across the
diﬀerent time frames. This indicates that most of the mass of the distribution of
35All other (categorical) variables included in the speciﬁcation not mentioned are set to the
reference category. The original estimation includes time-varying dummies indicating diﬀerent
seasons of the year. In the simulation, we assign each of these variables a time-constant value
representing their share in a given calendar year. This way we obtain expected outcome durations
that are seasonally adjusted.
26unemployment spells lies to the left of the smallest truncation point, i.e. ﬁve years,
and allowing for a longer time horizon therefore has only little eﬀect on the results.36
Overall, the graphs reveal that, compared to nonparticipation, short-term training
tends to reduce average unemployment duration while long-term training tends to
increase it. These eﬀects are the larger the earlier participation occurs during the
unemployment spell. In fact, the mean unemployment duration of the represen-
tative man can be reduced, depending on the time frame considered, by 20 to 30
days if short-term training occurs during the ﬁrst three months of unemployment.
A participation in long-term training starting in the ﬁrst three months of unem-
ployment increases the mean unemployment duration of the representative man by
up to four months, and by a somewhat more than two months when it is started
after three months in unemployment. The patterns for the representative woman
are qualitatively similar. The expected unemployment duration in the absence of
training is 228 days in the top right graph. The unemployment reducing eﬀect of
short-term training is slightly stronger and the adverse eﬀect of long-term training
is substantially weaker compared to the representative man. In particular, a partic-
ipation in short-term training can reduce the expected unemployment duration by
up to 37 days. A participation in long-term training within the ﬁrst three months
of unemployment increases the expected employment duration by 68 to 86 days
maximally.
In order to better understand these patterns, recall that the unemployment hazard
exhibits negative duration dependence, i.e. the probability of exiting to employment
decreases with elapsed unemployment duration. A participation in training basically
leads to a proportional upward or downward shift of the exit rate to work whose
amount varies over time. The treatment eﬀect of short-term training on the un-
employment hazard is highest around expected program completion and decreases
thereafter. Long-term training, on the contrary, strongly reduces the unemployment
hazard if the planned program end lies more than one month ahead and increases the
hazard rate out of unemployment strongly from the moment of expected program
completion up to one and a half years thereafter. This means that, in absolute terms,
the positive impact of short-term training and the negative lock-in eﬀect of long-term
training are strongest for somebody taking part early in his or her unemployment
spell. Thus, the mean unemployment duration is shorter for earlier ST-starts than
for later starts, and the mean unemployment duration of LT-participants decreases
with elapsed unemployment duration at program start.
36The mean of the nontruncated distribution without training is 255 days for the representative
man and the nontruncated median is 128 days.
27In order to get an idea of the long-run impact of the programs, it is useful to com-
pare their eﬀects on unemployment duration with those on subsequent employment
duration. Table 4 displays the truncated mean employment duration as well as the
median employment duration by treatment status in the preceding unemployment
spell. It can be seen that the choice of the truncation point has a considerable eﬀect
on the projected truncated mean employment duration and the treatment eﬀect in
terms of the diﬀerence in mean durations. This is due to the fact that, unlike for
unemployment, very long spells are relatively common for employment. Therefore,
we also include the median durations in table 4. A participation in any of the two
training programs has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the duration of subsequent employment
spells. The employment prolonging eﬀect is larger for long-term training than for
short-term training and for the representative woman than for the representative
man. At the median of the untruncated distribution, we ﬁnd that a participation in
long-term training increases the subsequent employment spell of the representative
man on average by about nine months. For the representative female participant
in long-term training this diﬀerence is 19 months. As regards short-term training,
the eﬀects on employment duration are smaller, with less pronounced gender diﬀer-
ences. A participation in short-term training increases the subsequent employment
duration at the median by 5.5 (8) months for the representative man (woman).
— Insert table 4 about here. —
The above discussion implies that the sign of the overall eﬀect of long-term train-
ing is ambiguous. On the negative side, long-term training tends to increase the
length of unemployment spells, while on the positive side it increases subsequent
employment duration. Therefore, we also calculate the fraction of time spent in
unemployment by relating the expected unemployment duration to the sum of the
expected unemployment and employment duration. This gives the long-run unem-
ployment rate that is depicted in ﬁgure 6 for the representative man and woman as a
function of participation status and starting date of the program. The interpretation
of this ﬁgure is analogous to that of ﬁgure 5: the vertical distance between two lines
represents the treatment eﬀect associated with a participation at some given day of
unemployment plotted on the abscissae, except that this time the vertical diﬀerence
measures the percentage point change in the long-run unemployment rate.
— Insert ﬁgure 6 about here. —
Figure 6 shows that a participation in short-term training reduces the long-run un-
employment rate, and the eﬀect is larger the earlier a participation occurs during
28the unemployment spell. The overall eﬀectiveness of long-term training tends to
increase with elapsed unemployment duration at program start. The net eﬀect of
long-term training on the long-run unemployment rate is only positive if it is not
started too early. In the middle panel, for the representative man (woman) a par-
ticipation in long-term training within the ﬁrst six (three) months of unemployment
increases the long-run unemployment rate.
In order to get an idea of the cost-eﬀectiveness of the programs, consider the following
back-of-the-envelope calculation. A short-term training course costs on average 560
Euro and a long-term training course 5850 Euro (cf. table A2 in Appendix A). The
employment agency pays on average 1050 Euro unemployment compensation per
month for an unemployed entitled to unemployment beneﬁts. Thus, abstracting
from all other costs and gains associated with unemployment and employment, a
short-term training scheme will be cost-eﬀective if it saves in the long run more
than 16 days of unemployment per participant entitled to unemployment beneﬁts.
A long-term training course will be cost-eﬀective if it saves at least 169 days (i.e.
around six months) of unemployment in the long run.
Consider a time horizon of ten years (middle panel of ﬁgure 6). The representative
man (woman) spends 120 £ 0:21 ¼ 25 months (120 £ 0:20 ¼ 24 months) out of
these ten years in unemployment if he (she) does not participate in any training
program. First consider the cost-eﬀectiveness of an early participation in short-
term training. If the representative man enrols in short-term training during the ﬁrst
three months of his unemployment spell he will stay in total 120£0:18 ¼ 22 months
out of ten years unemployed. The representative woman also saves about three
months in unemployment through participating in short-term training. Thus, an
early participation in short-term training seems to be cost-eﬀective for a person with
the same characteristics as the representative man and woman. Moreover, although
the overall eﬀectiveness of short-term training declines with elapsed unemployment
duration, its impact still exceeds the amount necessary for cost-eﬀectiveness even if
it is started only after two years of unemployment.
Next consider the cost-eﬀectiveness of a participation in long-term training within
the ﬁrst three months of the second year of unemployment (days 366 to 457) when its
long-run eﬀectiveness ﬂattens out. If the representative man starts training between
day 366 and 457, the long-run fraction of time spent in unemployment decreases by
about two percentage points which is equivalent to two months. The representative
woman saves about three months in unemployment. Comparing these numbers with
the six-months threshold established above, long-term training does not seem to be
29cost-eﬀective for the ﬁctitious, representative persons considered here. However,
this latter conclusion depends on the time horizon chosen. The positive impact
of training on employment duration increases with the length of the time horizon
considered. This means that the rather negative impact of long-term training on
unemployment duration becomes less important relative to its positive impact on
employment duration. With a time horizon of 20 years, both programs are cost-
eﬀective for the representative man and woman.
6.3 Assessment of Overall Impacts
How do the treated individuals in our data fare with training and does training pay
oﬀ in the long run? In order to answer these questions we computed the truncated
mean unemployment and employment durations for every treated individual in the
sample in the same way as for the representative persons above using a time frame
of ten years.37 We then analyze the eﬀectiveness of training by calculating the
fraction of participants who experience a shorter mean unemployment duration, a
longer mean employment duration, and for whom a participation is cost-eﬀective. A
participation in training is considered to be cost-eﬀective if the net reduction in time
spent unemployed leads to savings in unemployment beneﬁts that equal at least the
training costs.38
Column 1 of table 5 displays the results from these calculations under the actual
distribution of program starts. It can be seen that 69% of the participants in short-
term training exhibit a reduction in mean unemployment duration. For 36% (27%)
of the participants this reduction is at least three (six) months. The fraction of
participants in long-term training experiencing a shorter mean unemployment du-
ration is considerably lower with a value of 46%. As regards employment, a similar
fraction of participants in short-term and long-term training, i.e. around 70%, ex-
perience longer employment spells through training, but the employment gains are
more substantial for participants in long-term training. 42% of those participating in
long-term training experience an increase in mean employment duration of at least
183 days, while the same holds for only 22% of the participants in short-term train-
ing. A participation in short-term training is cost-eﬀective for 69% of the trainees,
whereas this share amounts to 44% for long-term training.
37For this purpose, we randomly assigned each person a value of the latent factors using the
estimated probabilities of the masspoints.
38We assume that one month of unemployment costs around 1050 Euro, a participation in short-
term training 560 Euro and in long-term training 5850 Euro.
30— Insert table 5 about here. —
In columns 2 to 5 of table 5, we present results for the hypothetical scenario that all
individuals started training at the same day of unemployment given in the column
header. The results for short term training in the upper panel indicate that, regard-
less of the starting date considered, in about 30% of the cases participation would
always lead to longer unemployment spells. However, among the individuals for
whom participation in short-term training has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on unemployment
duration the positive eﬀect can be further improved through targeting an early par-
ticipation. If all individuals hypothetically started short-term training at day 30 of
unemployment 45%, instead of 36% under the actual distribution of starting dates,
would enjoy mean unemployment durations that were at least three months shorter
compared to the situation of nonparticipation. The picture for long-term training
goes the other way round. Columns two to ﬁve in the lower panel of table 5 show
that through targeting a later starting date during unemployment the adverse eﬀect
of participation on unemployment duration can be mitigated. In the hypotheti-
cal scenario that all individuals enroled at day 180, mean unemployment durations
would be shorter for 50%, compared to 37% in the scenario where everybody started
at day 30.
6.4 Discussion
From a policy point of view, the above ﬁndings show that the timing of training
during an unemployment spell is an important dimension of eﬀect heterogeneity that
should be taken into account in the design of active labor market policies. Given
that the job-ﬁnding probability declines over time, short training programs that do
not lock the participants into the program should preferably be assigned very early
in the unemployment spell when the absolute gain out of a participation is highest.
Long training programs, in contrast, should not be assigned too early in order to
avoid that participants are locked into the program while their chances to ﬁnd a
job on their own are highest. However, the results do not imply that employment
agencies should switch to a regime which assigns training slots as a deterministic
function of elapsed unemployment duration. As the unemployed would eventually
get to know this rule they would adjust their search behavior accordingly. Depending
on whether they would like or dislike the outlook of participating at some given date
in the future they would increase or decrease their search eﬀort to make the desired
outcome more likely.
317 Conclusion
In many advanced countries, the focus of active labor market policy recently shifted
away from comprehensive training schemes aiming at long-term human capital de-
velopment towards active job-search schemes emphasizing quick job entry. This
study investigated and compared the dynamic causal eﬀects of short, job-search ori-
ented training and traditional long-term training schemes in Germany, where both
program types were used at the same time. In order to provide a more detailed
understanding of how these programs work, we analyzed their impacts on unem-
ployment as well as employment spells, taking into account the role of the timing of
participation during unemployment for the overall outcome.
We show that participants in training programs tend to reduce their search intensity
during program participation (lock-in eﬀect). These negative impacts of participat-
ing in a program are less pronounced and only temporary for short-term training,
while the lock-in of participants in long-term training tends to be much deeper and
longer, depending on the remaining time until the planned program end. The exit
rates to employment of participants recover towards the expected completion date
of the program. Positive impacts of training are highest right after the expected
completion date. While those of short-term training quickly fade away, those of
long-term training tend to persist over a long period.
We also ﬁnd that treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous across observed and unob-
served characteristics of the participants. Both training programs have stronger
beneﬁcial eﬀects for women than for men. Training impacts also vary signiﬁcantly
by age, health status, disability status, and nationality of participants. There is
only little eﬀect heterogeneity across formal educational degrees.
The instantaneous shifts in the exit rates out of unemployment and employment are
reﬂected in corresponding changes in the expected unemployment and employment
duration. While participating in short-term training tends to reduce the expected
unemployment duration, long-term training may increase it. In contrast, long-term
training tends to have a larger beneﬁcial eﬀect on the expected employment duration
than short-term training. Taking into account the heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects
according to the timing of training during unemployment, the overall gains out of
short-term training are highest when it is started early in the unemployment spell,
while long-term training attains better outcomes when it is started after three to
six (or even more) months of unemployment.
Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that short-term training schemes
32are likely cost-eﬀective for the majority of participants in the sample (i.e. for 69%
assuming a time horizon of ten years). Long-term training schemes do not tend to
be cost-eﬀective for the majority of participants (i.e. they are cost-eﬀective for 44%
assuming a time horizon of ten years). The cost-eﬀectiveness of long-term training
is sensitive to the starting date of training. It can be raised by avoiding assignments
of newly unemployed.
In sum, the results obtained in this study have the following general implications for
the design of active labor market policies. First, short, job-search oriented training
schemes can be an eﬀective and ﬁnancially proﬁtable tool to reduce unemployment
in the long run, in particular if participation occurs early during unemployment.
Participation in a short-term training course costs only a small fraction of what
has to be paid for a more comprehensive human capital oriented training scheme,
while the overall eﬀectiveness of the short course tends to be no smaller than that
of the long one. This is due to the fact that short-term training schemes, unlike
long-term training programs, do not prevent participants from searching for new
jobs for a long time. Second, because of their potentially substantial adverse eﬀects
on unemployment duration long-term training schemes should rather not be given to
newly unemployed individuals who are likely to exit unemployment relatively quickly
on their own. Third, although we ﬁnd that the timing of training is an important
driver of the overall eﬀectiveness of both programs our results do not imply that
an assignment regime in which all unemployed enrol automatically after a given
time would be advantageous. The reason is that anticipation of future participation
would likely change the search behavior of the unemployed.
From a conceptual point of view, this study highlights that time is an important
dimension in evaluation analyses which can hardly be incorporated in experimental
designs. A detailed analysis of the dynamics of program assignment and labor
market outcomes allows a deeper understanding of how programs work. This is
important for the optimal allocation of employment services. Dynamic outcomes
may not just involve unemployment and employment durations, as considered here,
but also e.g. transitions into and out of low income spells. Such an analysis is left
for future research.
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Figure 1: Hazard Rate into Training Programs
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Figure 3: Hazard Rate out of Unemployment by Treatment Status
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Figure 4: Treatment Eﬀects on the Unemployment Hazard
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Notes: The treatment eﬀects correspond to the eﬀects for a 38 year old German man without
disability or health restrictions, and an education diﬀerent than vocational education degree. The
starting date of long-term training is set to day 110 of unemployment. The unobserved hetero-
geneity terms are set to their means.
39Figure 5: Truncated Expectation of Unemployment Duration by Starting Date of
Program
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Notes: The calculations are for a representative person. The three panels entitled ﬁve, ten, and 20
years indicate the diﬀerent truncation points until which the integration is performed.
40Figure 6: Long-Run Unemployment Rate by Starting Date of Program





























0 91 182 273 364 455 546 637 728
Days until program start




























0 91 182 273 364 455 546 637 728
Days until program start


























0 91 182 273 364 455 546 637 728
Days until program start

























0 91 182 273 364 455 546 637 728
Days until program start






















0 91 182 273 364 455 546 637 728
Days until program start





















0 91 182 273 364 455 546 637 728
Days until program start
No training Short training Long training
Notes: The calculations are for a representative person. The long-run unemployment rate is
computed as the truncated mean unemployment duration divided by the sum of the truncated
mean unemployment and the truncated mean employment duration. The truncation points are
ﬁve (top), ten (middle), and 20 years (bottom panel), respectively.
41Tables
Table 1: Sample Size (Spells by Spell Type)
Spell type Censored Completed Total
UE to EM 30,456 56,706 87,162
34.94% 65.06% 100.00%
UE to ST 78,677 8,485 87,162
90.27% 9.73% 100.00%
UE to LT 81,774 5,388 87,162
93.82% 6.18% 100.00%
EM to UE 15,840 49,282 65,122
24.32% 75.68% 100.00%
Total 206,747 119,861 326,608
63.30% 36.70% 100.00%
Notes: UE to EM, ST, and LT denotes unemployment with destination state employment, short-
term training, and long-term training, respectively. EM to UE denotes employment with destina-
tion state unemployment.
Table 2: Individuals by Number of Spells of a Given Type
Number of spells Frequency Percent Cumulated
Spell type: UE to EM, ST, and LT
1 23,705 52.19 52.19
2 11,494 25.31 77.50
3 or more 10,221 22.50 100.00
Total 45,420 100.00
Spell type: EM to UE
0 12,163 26.78 26.78
1 16,890 37.19 63.97
2 8,290 18.25 82.22
3 or more 8,077 17.78 100.00
Total 45,420 100.00
Notes: UE to EM, ST, and LT denotes unemployment with destination state employment, short-
term training, and long-term training, respectively. EM to UE denotes employment with destina-
tion state unemployment.
42Table 3: Treatment Eﬀects on the Hazard Rates
Short-Term Training Long-Term Training
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)
Treatment Eﬀects on Hazard Rate from Unemployment to Employment
tx
ST ¡ tST > 15 -0.763 (0.092)¤¤¤ tx
LT ¡ tLT > 360 -3.012 (0.137)¤¤¤
15 ¸ tx
ST ¡ tST > 0 0.203 (0.083)¤¤ 360 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > 180 -2.339 (0.120)¤¤¤
0 ¸ tx
ST ¡ tST > ¡31 0.423 (0.076)¤¤¤ 180 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > 90 -1.776 (0.108)¤¤¤
¡31 ¸ tx
ST ¡ tST > ¡361 -0.181 (0.079)¤¤ 90 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > 30 -1.097 (0.105)¤¤¤
tx
ST ¡ tST · ¡361 -0.379 (0.101)¤¤¤ 30 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > 0 -0.160 (0.103)
(¡31 · tx
ST ¡ tST > ¡361)£fem. 0.650 (0.111)¤¤¤ 0 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > ¡91 0.517 (0.095)¤¤¤
(tx
ST ¡ tST ¸ ¡361)£female 0.703 (0.138)¤¤¤ ¡91 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > ¡181 0.270 (0.105)¤¤¤
¡181 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > ¡361 0.117 (0.110)
¡361 ¸ tx
LT ¡ tLT > ¡541 -0.002 (0.130)
tx




LT) squared 0.020 (0.008)¤¤¤
ST£female -0.143 (0.054)¤¤¤ LT£female 0.200 (0.043)¤¤¤
ST£foreign 0.093 (0.036)¤¤ LT£foreign 0.171 (0.047)¤¤¤
ST£disabled 0.092 (0.041)¤¤ LT£disabled 0.060 (0.025)¤¤
ST£minor health constraints 0.099 (0.070) LT£minor health constraints 0.132 (0.085)
ST£strong health constraints 0.340 (0.072)¤¤¤ LT£strong health constraints 0.268 (0.088)¤¤¤
ST£age/10 0.207 (0.224) LT£age/10 0.486 (0.288)¤
ST£age/10 squared -0.035 (0.029) LT£age/10 squared -0.080 (0.038)¤¤
LT£vocational education -0.206 (0.043)¤¤¤
Treatment Eﬀects on Hazard Rate from Employment to Unemployment
ST 0.033 (0.072) LT 0.062 (0.096)
ST£female -0.023 (0.047) LT£female -0.133 (0.057)¤¤
ST£foreign -0.046 (0.067) LT£foreign 0.227 (0.086)¤¤¤
ST£ethnic German -0.336 (0.146)¤¤ LT£ethnic German 0.119 (0.142)
ST£strong health constraints 0.524 (0.101)¤¤¤ LT£disabled 0.036 (0.015)¤¤
Unobserved Heterogeneity in Treatment Eﬀects During Unemployment
factor loading on w1 0.284 (0.077)¤¤¤ factor loading on w1 0.266 (0.084)¤¤¤
factor loading on w2 -0.004 (0.038) factor loading on w2 -0.139 (0.055)¤¤
Unobserved Heterogeneity in Treatment Eﬀects During Employment
factor loading on w1 -0.169 (0.088)¤ factor loading on w1 -0.307 (0.110)¤¤¤
factor loading on w2 0.105 (0.035)¤¤¤ factor loading on w2 0.089 (0.052)¤
Probabilities
Pr(w1 = 1) 0.846 (0.013)¤¤¤
Pr(w2 = 1) 0.301 (0.023)¤¤¤
Notes: ST and LT indicate participation in short-term and long-term training, respectively.
During unemployment these variables are time-varying and equal to one from the moment of
program start onwards. During employment these dummies equal one if a participation took place
in the previous unemployment spell. tn
p, p = ST; LT, denotes the starting date of short-term and
long-term training, respectively, tx
p the planned program duration, and tp the elapsed time since
program start. The variable age is centered around 38 years, ln(tn
LT) around the log of 110 days.
Unobserved heterogeneity is modeled as a two factor loading speciﬁcation. The two independent
latent factors w1 and w2 are distributed with support f¡1;1g. ¤, ¤¤ and ¤¤¤ denote signiﬁcance
at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%- level, respectively. The complete estimation results are given in table
D1, column 3, in Appendix D.
43Table 4: Truncated Expectation and Median of Employment Duration in Days by
Treatment Status
5 Years 10 Years 20 Years Median
Representative Man
No training 566 958 1350 716
Short training 586 1022 1509 887
Long training 595 1050 1585 985
Representative Woman
No training 581 1007 1469 839
Short training 603 1077 1656 1083
Long training 624 1149 1865 1413
Notes: The calculations are for a representative person. The ﬁrst three columns display the
truncated expectation with truncation at ﬁve, ten, and 20 years, respectively. The last column
shows the median duration.
44Table 5: Overall Impact Assessment for Treated Individuals in the Sample
Actual 30 180 360 720
Short-Term Training
Shorter unemployed 0.693 0.699 0.694 0.697 0.678
– by 90 days or more 0.362 0.454 0.325 0.288 0.278
– by 183 days or more 0.265 0.271 0.262 0.260 0.260
Longer employed 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705
– by 183 days or more 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218
– by 365 days or more 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Cost eﬀective 0.694 0.697 0.692 0.691 0.686
Long-Term Training
Shorter unemployed 0.462 0.369 0.498 0.536 0.575
– by 90 days or more 0.314 0.276 0.352 0.331 0.282
– by 183 days or more 0.237 0.203 0.249 0.260 0.260
Longer employed 0.708 0.708 0.708 0.708 0.708
– by 183 days or more 0.427 0.427 0.427 0.427 0.427
– by 365 days or more 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195
Cost eﬀective 0.436 0.383 0.464 0.479 0.483
Notes: The rows labeled ‘Shorter unemployed’ contain the fraction of treated individuals in the
sample who experience on average a shorter unemployment duration through participating in
training. Likewise the rows labeled ‘Longer employed’ display the fraction of treated individuals
who experience on average a longer employment spell after training. The rows labeled ‘Cost
eﬀective’ give the corresponding fraction of trainees for whom the participation is cost-eﬀective
in the sense that saved unemployment beneﬁts due to shorter unemployment spells and/or longer
employment spells exceed training costs. The calculations are based on truncated expectations of
unemployment and employment durations, where the time horizon is ten years. The ﬁrst column
refers to the actual distribution of program starts, whereas the other columns refer to scenarios
where all participants start at the same day of elapsed unemployment indicated in the column
header.
45Supplementary Appendix
A Further Institutional Information
A.1 Regulation of Training
The main goal of active labor market policy in Germany is to permanently rein-
tegrate unemployed and persons at severe risk of becoming unemployed into em-
ployment. It comprises a variety of measures ranging from subsidized employment
on the ﬁrst labor market, job creation schemes on the second labor market to training
programs that adjust and enhance the qualiﬁcations of participants. Employment
subsidies aim at promoting either dependent employment or business start-ups. Job
creation schemes provide employment opportunities in non-proﬁt organizations for
long-term and diﬃcult-to-place unemployed. In addition to these large scale pro-
grams, there also exist programs targeted to particular groups as e.g. young or
disabled persons. Active labor market policy is complemented by placement and
advisory services, that are increasingly contracted out to private providers.
The legislation distinguishes three main types of training, further training (Beru-
ﬂiche Weiterbildung), retraining (Beruﬂiche Weiterbildung mit Abschluss in einem
anerkannten Ausbildungsberuf ), and short-term training measures (Trainingsmaß-
nahmen und Maßnahmen der Eignungsfeststellung).39 Whereas further training and
retraining have kept their place in active labor market policy nearly unaltered since
the 1970s short-term training has been reintroduced in 1998 after a similar program
type had been abolished in the early 1990s.
To become eligible for any active labor market program job-seekers have to person-
ally register at the local employment agency. This involves a counseling interview
with the caseworker. Besides being registered as unemployed or job-seeker at risk
of becoming unemployed, candidates for short-term training programs do not have
to fulﬁl any additional eligibility criteria. As regards long-term training schemes,
individuals are in principle only eligible if they also fulﬁl a minimum work crite-
rion of one year and are entitled to unemployment compensation. However, there
exist various exceptions to these requirements. The really binding criterion is that
the training scheme has to be considered necessary by the caseworker in order for
39In the empirical analysis, we focus on the distinction between traditional further and retraining
schemes as opposed to short-term training. Thus, we neglect the distinction between further
training and retraining and subsume both categories under the notion traditional further training
or long-term training.
46the job-seeker to ﬁnd a new job. This is for instance the case if the employment
chances in the target occupation of a job-seeker are good but require an additional
adjustment of his skills.
Participation in the program is mandatory once the job-seeker has been assigned to
a speciﬁc course or a training voucher, respectively. However, the unemployed are
generally encouraged to continue searching while they are enroled in training. In
particular, training providers are expected to assist the participants in their search.
Dropping out of a program in order to take up a job does therefore not contravene
the rule of mandatory participation.
Training costs as well as examination fees, traveling and child-care costs are cov-
ered by the employment agency. In addition, participants in long-term training
schemes typically draw subsistence payments that have the same amount as the un-
employment compensation payments they would otherwise receive.40 Participants
in training programs who are not entitled to unemployment insurance payments
may receive subsistence payments that are ﬁnanced by the European Social Fund.
A.2 Aggregate Figures on Participation and Expenditures
Long-term training schemes have traditionally been the most important ﬁeld of
active labor market policy in Germany. Since 1998 there have been several reforms
leading to a focus on measures considered particularly eﬀective in activating the
unemployed in the short run and in preventing long-term unemployment. Thus,
allocation of resources was shifted away from the very comprehensive long-term
training schemes to the short-term training measures. In fact, ﬁgure A1 as well
as table A1 show a decline in entries in the long-term training programs – in the
Western Länder as well as in total Germany – whereas participation in short-term
training increases over time.
From table A2 it can be seen that the average monthly training costs per participant
are slightly lower for short-term training courses (560 Euros on average) than for
traditional long-term training schemes (650 Euros on average). Most striking is the
great diﬀerence in average duration of the courses, that is displayed in the lower
40Unemployment compensation, in contrast to social assistance, is granted to individuals who
are able and available to work or who participate in active labor market programs. Basically,
unemployed who previously worked for at least twelve months within the last three years qualify
for unemployment beneﬁts. The amount and the entitlement period depend on the previous salary,
age, and work experience. After expiration of their unemployment beneﬁts unemployed individuals
may receive the lower, means tested unemployment assistance.
47panel of table A2. While short-term training courses last on average one month, the
mean duration of long-term training programs lies between eight and ten months.
Under the budgetary pressure caused by a persistently high unemployment rate and
in light of these large diﬀerences in costs, the share of short-term training measures
drastically increased in 2002 and, in 2003 and 2004, this rise continues at the expense
of the traditional longer-term measures. Of course, the higher training costs of the
latter would be justiﬁed if they were associated with correspondingly higher gains.
















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Short−term training Long−term training
Job creation schemes Employment subsidies
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2001a, 2003a), Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2005a); own calcula-
tions.
Table A1: Entries into Active Labor Market Programs in West Germany (in 1000)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Training schemes 714 770 643 972 985 1,038
– long-term training 307 338 261 273 161 124
– short-term training 265 286 339 545 690 789
Employment subsidies 245 225 206 245 365 481
Placement & advisory services 286 279 296 375 640 1,398
Job creation schemes 96 89 73 63 39 42
Speciﬁc measures for youths 327 265 280 295 262 270
Other 231 296 370 345 17 175
Total 1,899 1,924 1,867 2,295 2,308 3,405
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2001a, 2003a), Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2005a); own calcula-
tions.
48Table A2: Average Monthly Expenditures and Program Durations
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Average monthly expenditures (in Euro)
Short-term training 602 580 570 658 538 421
Long-term training 1,570 1,627 1,668 1,686 1,555 1,574
– subsistence allowance 1,093 1,152 1,178 1,188 1,156 1,150
– training costs 629 640 664 681 631 627
Unemployment beneﬁts 1,132 1,160 1,189 1,185 1,261 1,313
Unemployment assistance 869 753 721 727 691 713
Average program duration (in months)
Short-term training 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9
Long-term training 8.4 8.2 9.3 9.1 10.5 10.7
Notes: The upper panel contains the average monthly expenditures (in Euro) per partici-
pant/beneﬁt recipient, the lower panel the average program duration in months. Expenditures
on subsistence allowance, unemployment beneﬁts and unemployment assistance include social se-
curity contributions. Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2000, 2001b, 2002, 2003b), Bundesagentur
für Arbeit (2004, 2005b, 2005c); own calculations.
49B Further Details on the Data Used
This study uses data from the IEBS, a 2.2% sample from the Integrated Employ-
ment Biographies (IEB) Version 4.02. These data are compiled by the Research
Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency.41 The IEB is an inte-
grated data base combining administrative records out of four diﬀerent sources:
the Employment History (Beschäftigten-Historik), the Beneﬁt Recipient History
(Leistungsempfänger-Historik), the Job-Seeker Database (Bewerberangebot), and
the Program Participation History (Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatenbank).
The Employment History and the Beneﬁt Recipient History contain spells of employ-
ment and receipt of diﬀerent types of unemployment beneﬁts, respectively. The two
data sources cover a time span ranging from January 1990 to December 2004 (em-
ployment) and June 2005 (beneﬁts), respectively. The information on start and end
dates as well as salaries and beneﬁt payments is of high accuracy in these two ﬁles
because it is directly relevant for the underlying administrative purposes. Further-
more, the information in the Employment and the Beneﬁt Recipient History allows
one to calculate the individual entitlement periods to unemployment beneﬁts.42
The Program Participation History contains detailed information on participation
in active labor market programs taking place in the period 2000 to mid-2005. Com-
paring the entries into diﬀerent programs in 1999 with the ﬁgures for later years
shows that information on programs starting in 1999 seems to be already complete
for most active labor market programs. Furthermore, this database allows to dis-
tinguish subsidized employment in the context of active labor market policy from
regular employment.
The Job-Seeker Database contains information on job search episodes. In partic-
ular, it allows to distinguish whether an individual is registered as a job-seeker
who may still hold a job or as an unemployed. Whereas the Employment and the
Beneﬁt Recipient History contain only a limited set of variables, the Job-Seeker
Database includes a rich variety of information on personal characteristics (in par-
41For descriptions of the data in German see Hummel et al. (2005), Zimmermann et al. (2007),
and Oberschachtsiek et al. (2009). For information in English see Jacobebbinghaus and Seth
(2007) as well as the web site of the Research Data Center of the Federal Employment Agency
(http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx). The data are subject to conﬁdentiality regulations. A weakly anony-
mous version can be used on-site and via controlled remote access, a factually anonymous version is
available as scientiﬁc use ﬁle, in which regional information, nationality and industry are provided
at a more aggregated level. The analysis in this paper is based on a weakly anonymous version.
42For the calculation of the claims, the present study relies on Plaßmann (2002) that contains a
summary of the diﬀerent regulations.
50ticular education, family status and health), and information related to placement
ﬁelds (e.g. qualiﬁcation and experience in the target profession). The Job-Seeker
Database contains all the records starting January 2000 to June 2005 and partly
also those beginning before 2000 if the person in question keeps the same client
number throughout.
C List of Variables Used in the Estimation
Table C1: Variable Deﬁnitions
Name Deﬁnition
bhazXX time-varying dummy equal to one if elapsed duration (in days)
is greater than XX days and smaller than or equal the number of
days referring to the next time interval dummy; the last interval
is open ended
female dummy equal to one if female
agegroup age in 6 categories: 1 25-29 years, 2 30-34 years, 3 35-39 years,
4 40-44 years, 5 45-49 years, 6 50 or older
age, agesq age divided by ten, age squared divided by 100, centered around
38 years
f_age, f_agesq age, agesq interacted with female
foreign dummy equal to one if citizenship is not German
ethnicgerman dummy equal to one if ethnic German, i.e. returned settler from
former German settlements
education 1 information missing, 2 no degree, 3 vocational training degree,
4 university or technical college degree
schooling 1 information missing, 2 no schooling degree, 3 Hauptschulab-
schluss or Mittlere Reife/Fachoberschule (degrees reached after
completion of the 9th or 10th grade), 4 Fachhochschulreife or
Abitur/Hochschulreife (degrees reached after completion of the
12th or 13th grade)
health when unemployed with four categories: 1 no information avail-
able, 2 no health problems mentioned, 3 health problems, but
considered without impact on placement, 4 health problems con-
sidered to have an impact on placement; when employed dummy
equal to one if person had health problems aﬀecting placement
within last two months of job search before start of employment
spell
disabled dummy equal to one if disabled
family 1 information missing; 2 living alone; 3 not married, but living
together with at least one person; 4 lone parent; 5 married
kids dummy equal to one if person has at least one child
youngchild dummy equal to one if person has children younger than 10 years
<continued on next page>
51Table C1: Variable Deﬁnitions <continued>
Name Deﬁnition
seekpt dummy equal to one if seeking only parttime job (unemployment
spells only)
tarexp dummy equal to one if caseworker considers job-seeker to
have professional experience in target profession (unemployment
spells only)
taredu 1 information missing, 2 caseworker considers job-seeker not suf-
ﬁciently qualiﬁed for target profession, 3 considered with vo-
cational qualiﬁcation, 4 considered highly qualiﬁed (unemploy-
ment spells only)
endlastjob 1 if other reason and missing, 2 if termination of last employment
by employer, 3 by employee, 4 ﬁxed term contract (unemploy-
ment spells only)
land 10 categories indicating the West German Bundesländer (place
of residence): 1 SH, 2 HH, 3 NI, 4 HB, 5 NW, 6 HE, 7 RP, 8
BW, 9 BY, 10 SL
area West German Bundesländer aggregated into 4 categories (place
of residence): 1 SH, NI, HB, HH; 2 NW, 3 HE, RP, SL; 4 BY,
BW
rtype classiﬁcation of the districts of residence according to local labor
market conditions into 5 groups
occupation occupation (of last employment) in 8 categories: 1 missing; 2 el-
ementary occupations; 3 skilled agriculture and ﬁshery workers;
4 craftsmen, machine operators and related; 5 service workers; 6
clerks; 7 technicians and associate professionals; 8 professionals
and managers
industry industry (of last employment) in 7 categories: 1 missing; 2 agri-
culture, forestry, ﬁshing; 3 manufacturing; 4 construction; 5
trade and transport; 6 ﬁnancial, renting and business; 7 other
services
seasonwork dummy equal to one if industry (of last employment) character-
ized by seasonal work
whitecollar dummy equal to one if white-collar job
bluecollar dummy equal to one if blue-collar job
parttime dummy equal to one if weekly hours worked less than full-time
earlycontact dummy equal to one if already registered as job-seeker up to
three months before beginning of current unemployment spell
(unemployment spells only)
prevtrans dummy equal to one if received some kind of unemployment
insurance beneﬁts in the three years preceding the current un-
employment spell (unemployment spells only)
daqtiv time-varying dummy equal to one in year of introduction of Job-
AQTIV reform (i.e. in 2002) (unemployment spells only)
oﬀben time-varying dummy equal to one if temporarily oﬀ unemploy-
ment transfers because of sanctions (unemployment spells only)
<continued on next page>
52Table C1: Variable Deﬁnitions <continued>
Name Deﬁnition
q1, q2, q3, q4 dummy equal to one if spell starts in the ﬁrst, second, third,
fourth quarter of the year
y1999-y2004 year of starting date of spell
season1-season4 time-varying dummies indicating the current calender quarter
hasclaim time-varying dummy equal to one if entitled to unemployment
beneﬁts and claim not yet expired (unemployment spells only)
totclaim, totclaimsq time-varying variable, (square of) total entitlement period for
unemployment beneﬁts in months interacted with hasclaim, cen-
tered around twelve months (unemployment spells only)
ubendXX time-varying dummy equal to one if the number of days until
expiration of the unemployment claim is smaller or equal to
XX days and larger than the number of days referring to the
next interval dummy or greater than zero in the last interval
(unemployment spells only)
lwquart1-lwaquart4 dummy variables indicating the quartile of last salary, additional
category for information missing in employment spells only
lnlwage, lnlwagesq log of last real salary, square of log of last real salary if salary is
below social security threshold, else zero
clwc, clws variables indicating whether last salary is above (clwc) or below
(clws) social security threshold
pst time-varying dummy equal to one if participation in short-term
training has started (unemployment spells only)
stend_XX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of days
until scheduled program end of short-term training is smaller or
equal to XX days and larger than the number of days referring to
the next interval dummy; the last interval ends at the scheduled
completion date (unemployment spells only)
stendXX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of days
after scheduled program completion of short-term training is
greater or equal to XX days and smaller than the number of
days referring to the next interval dummy; the last interval is
open ended (unemployment spells only)
pft time-varying dummy equal to one if participation in long-term
training has started (unemployment spells only)
ltend_XX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of days
until scheduled program end of long-term training is smaller or
equal to XX days and larger than the number of days referring to
the next interval dummy; the last interval ends at the scheduled
completion date (unemployment spells only)
ltendXX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of
days after scheduled program completion of long-term training
is greater or equal to XX days and smaller than the number of
days referring to the next interval dummy; the last interval is
open ended (unemployment spells only)
<continued on next page>
53Table C1: Variable Deﬁnitions <continued>
Name Deﬁnition
lntft, lntftsq time-varying, (square of) log of days unemployed at start of
long-term training, positive if program has started otherwise
zero, centered around 110 days (unemployment spells only)
dst dummy equal to one if participated in short-term training during
previous unemployment spell (employment spells only)
dft dummy equal to one if participated in long-term training during
previous unemployment spell (employment spells only)
Notes: If not noted otherwise, variables are time constant and refer to the start of a spell. In
unemployment spells, job characteristics refer to the previous employment. Descriptions of addi-
tional interaction terms and aggregated categories are omitted if the content can be inferred from
the variable name and the context. For example the variable industry67 is equal to one if industry
is either category 6 or 7; a variable name starting with f_ indicates an interaction with the dummy
female.
D Detailed Estimation Results
Table D1: Estimated Coeﬃcients
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Unemployment to Employment
bhaz30 1.053 (0.019)¤¤¤ 1.137 (0.019)¤¤¤ 1.139 (0.019)¤¤¤
bhaz50 1.056 (0.020)¤¤¤ 1.218 (0.020)¤¤¤ 1.221 (0.021)¤¤¤
bhaz70 1.001 (0.020)¤¤¤ 1.237 (0.022)¤¤¤ 1.243 (0.022)¤¤¤
bhaz90 1.199 (0.020)¤¤¤ 1.496 (0.022)¤¤¤ 1.504 (0.022)¤¤¤
bhaz110 1.045 (0.022)¤¤¤ 1.382 (0.024)¤¤¤ 1.393 (0.024)¤¤¤
bhaz130 0.676 (0.025)¤¤¤ 1.046 (0.027)¤¤¤ 1.058 (0.027)¤¤¤
bhaz150 0.924 (0.024)¤¤¤ 1.319 (0.026)¤¤¤ 1.333 (0.027)¤¤¤
bhaz170 0.692 (0.027)¤¤¤ 1.104 (0.029)¤¤¤ 1.120 (0.029)¤¤¤
bhaz190 0.237 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.662 (0.035)¤¤¤ 0.679 (0.035)¤¤¤
bhaz210 0.515 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.951 (0.033)¤¤¤ 0.968 (0.033)¤¤¤
bhaz230 0.229 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.677 (0.028)¤¤¤ 0.694 (0.029)¤¤¤
bhaz290 -0.025 (0.034) 0.431 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.449 (0.037)¤¤¤
bhaz330 0.056 (0.044) 0.516 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.533 (0.047)¤¤¤
bhaz350 0.169 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.603 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.620 (0.046)¤¤¤
bhaz370 -0.159 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.264 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.282 (0.035)¤¤¤
bhaz460 -0.401 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.043 (0.039) 0.062 (0.039)
bhaz550 -0.604 (0.034)¤¤¤ -0.168 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.149 (0.038)¤¤¤
bhaz735 -1.116 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.664 (0.041)¤¤¤ -0.646 (0.042)¤¤¤
female 0.089 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.090 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.089 (0.019)¤¤¤
foreign -0.176 (0.010)¤¤¤ -0.178 (0.012)¤¤¤ -0.179 (0.012)¤¤¤
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ethnicgerman 0.106 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.131 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.130 (0.035)¤¤¤
seasonwork 0.279 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.299 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.301 (0.023)¤¤¤
whitecollar -0.277 (0.054)¤¤¤ -0.273 (0.064)¤¤¤ -0.271 (0.064)¤¤¤
bluecollar -0.136 (0.054)¤¤ -0.143 (0.064)¤¤ -0.142 (0.064)¤¤
parttime -0.218 (0.054)¤¤¤ -0.233 (0.064)¤¤¤ -0.233 (0.064)¤¤¤
area2 -0.116 (0.012)¤¤¤ -0.133 (0.016)¤¤¤ -0.132 (0.016)¤¤¤
area3 -0.008 (0.014) -0.004 (0.019) -0.003 (0.019)
area4 0.157 (0.014)¤¤¤ 0.209 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.211 (0.018)¤¤¤
rtyp2 -0.126 (0.015)¤¤¤ -0.146 (0.019)¤¤¤ -0.150 (0.019)¤¤¤
rtyp5 0.100 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.119 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.121 (0.015)¤¤¤
education3 0.108 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.172 (0.016)¤¤¤ 0.173 (0.016)¤¤¤
education4 0.093 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.140 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.138 (0.034)¤¤¤
schooling3 0.074 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.116 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.117 (0.020)¤¤¤
schooling4 0.076 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.113 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.113 (0.027)¤¤¤
occupation2 0.026 (0.020) 0.039 (0.024) 0.039 (0.024)
occupation3 0.297 (0.028)¤¤¤ 0.303 (0.038)¤¤¤ 0.295 (0.039)¤¤¤
occupation4 0.154 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.169 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.171 (0.023)¤¤¤
occupation5 0.146 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.151 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.155 (0.022)¤¤¤
occupation7 0.054 (0.020)¤¤¤ 0.041 (0.024)¤ 0.043 (0.024)¤
occupation8 0.085 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.096 (0.028)¤¤¤ 0.098 (0.028)¤¤¤
industry3 -0.155 (0.014)¤¤¤ -0.172 (0.017)¤¤¤ -0.170 (0.017)¤¤¤
industry4 0.149 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.185 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.186 (0.019)¤¤¤
industry67 -0.021 (0.013)¤ -0.018 (0.015) -0.016 (0.015)
agegroup2 -0.059 (0.014)¤¤¤ -0.068 (0.017)¤¤¤ -0.068 (0.017)¤¤¤
agegroup3 -0.121 (0.014)¤¤¤ -0.155 (0.018)¤¤¤ -0.155 (0.018)¤¤¤
agegroup4 -0.207 (0.018)¤¤¤ -0.269 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.273 (0.023)¤¤¤
agegroup5 -0.299 (0.018)¤¤¤ -0.353 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.359 (0.023)¤¤¤
agegroup6 -0.348 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.439 (0.032)¤¤¤ -0.447 (0.032)¤¤¤
f_agegroup4 0.063 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.098 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.098 (0.029)¤¤¤
f_agegroup6 -0.147 (0.032)¤¤¤ -0.165 (0.040)¤¤¤ -0.164 (0.041)¤¤¤
kids 0.058 (0.013)¤¤¤ 0.096 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.099 (0.017)¤¤¤
f_youngchild -0.309 (0.025)¤¤¤ -0.365 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.369 (0.030)¤¤¤
f_kids -0.047 (0.022)¤¤ -0.108 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.107 (0.029)¤¤¤
family3 -0.043 (0.023)¤ -0.067 (0.028)¤¤ -0.069 (0.029)¤¤
family4 -0.045 (0.026)¤ -0.082 (0.033)¤¤ -0.083 (0.033)¤¤
family5 0.022 (0.011)¤ -0.006 (0.014) -0.009 (0.015)
health3 -0.338 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.423 (0.025)¤¤¤ -0.427 (0.026)¤¤¤
health4 -0.519 (0.022)¤¤¤ -0.626 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.632 (0.027)¤¤¤
disabled -0.025 (0.006)¤¤¤ -0.038 (0.007)¤¤¤ -0.038 (0.007)¤¤¤
taredu3 0.045 (0.011)¤¤¤ 0.075 (0.014)¤¤¤ 0.077 (0.014)¤¤¤
tarexp -0.066 (0.015)¤¤¤ -0.086 (0.018)¤¤¤ -0.085 (0.018)¤¤¤
endlastjob3 -0.108 (0.019)¤¤¤ -0.111 (0.022)¤¤¤ -0.110 (0.022)¤¤¤
endlastjob4 0.087 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.082 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.082 (0.015)¤¤¤
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prevtrans 0.242 (0.011)¤¤¤ 0.223 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.224 (0.013)¤¤¤
y1999q4 0.029 (0.024) 0.025 (0.027) 0.023 (0.027)
y2000q1 0.043 (0.024)¤ 0.055 (0.027)¤¤ 0.056 (0.027)¤¤
y2000q2 -0.107 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.099 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.100 (0.030)¤¤¤
y2000q3 -0.057 (0.026)¤¤ -0.049 (0.029)¤ -0.051 (0.029)¤
y2000q4 -0.078 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.088 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.090 (0.027)¤¤¤
y2001q1 -0.100 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.110 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.111 (0.027)¤¤¤
y2001q2 -0.284 (0.026)¤¤¤ -0.297 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.298 (0.030)¤¤¤
y2001q3 -0.231 (0.025)¤¤¤ -0.261 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.266 (0.029)¤¤¤
y2001q4 -0.194 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.254 (0.026)¤¤¤ -0.257 (0.027)¤¤¤
y2002q1 -0.075 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.171 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.174 (0.033)¤¤¤
y2002q2 -0.474 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.599 (0.042)¤¤¤ -0.603 (0.042)¤¤¤
y2002q3 -0.394 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.509 (0.040)¤¤¤ -0.515 (0.040)¤¤¤
y2002q4 -0.205 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.346 (0.031)¤¤¤ -0.353 (0.031)¤¤¤
y2003q1 -0.181 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.319 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.321 (0.034)¤¤¤
y2003q2 -0.563 (0.040)¤¤¤ -0.758 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.761 (0.046)¤¤¤
y2003q3 -0.392 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.544 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.547 (0.043)¤¤¤
y2003q4 -0.229 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.404 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.409 (0.033)¤¤¤
y2004q1 -0.226 (0.032)¤¤¤ -0.417 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.423 (0.037)¤¤¤
y2004q2 -0.594 (0.049)¤¤¤ -0.791 (0.054)¤¤¤ -0.790 (0.054)¤¤¤
y2004q3 -0.577 (0.055)¤¤¤ -0.812 (0.060)¤¤¤ -0.816 (0.060)¤¤¤
y2004q4 -1.075 (0.093)¤¤¤ -1.326 (0.095)¤¤¤ -1.330 (0.095)¤¤¤
lwquart2 0.064 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.063 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.062 (0.017)¤¤¤
lwquart3 0.142 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.152 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.153 (0.018)¤¤¤
lwquart4 0.287 (0.016)¤¤¤ 0.300 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.299 (0.019)¤¤¤
hasclaim -0.437 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.436 (0.041)¤¤¤ -0.435 (0.041)¤¤¤
ubend60 0.174 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.182 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.180 (0.026)¤¤¤
ubend30 0.296 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.315 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.313 (0.027)¤¤¤
totclaim 0.071 (0.005)¤¤¤ 0.048 (0.006)¤¤¤ 0.048 (0.006)¤¤¤
totclaimsq -0.002 (0.000)¤¤¤ -0.002 (0.000)¤¤¤ -0.002 (0.000)¤¤¤
season2 0.317 (0.011)¤¤¤ 0.394 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.398 (0.012)¤¤¤
season3 0.135 (0.013)¤¤¤ 0.214 (0.014)¤¤¤ 0.219 (0.014)¤¤¤
season4 -0.325 (0.013)¤¤¤ -0.253 (0.014)¤¤¤ -0.248 (0.014)¤¤¤
pst 0.569 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.655 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.423 (0.076)¤¤¤
stend_16 -1.159 (0.069)¤¤¤ -1.197 (0.070)¤¤¤ -1.185 (0.069)¤¤¤
stend_15 -0.197 (0.059)¤¤¤ -0.244 (0.060)¤¤¤ -0.220 (0.060)¤¤¤
stend31 -0.561 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.569 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.604 (0.047)¤¤¤
stend361 -0.720 (0.069)¤¤¤ -0.748 (0.071)¤¤¤ -0.802 (0.075)¤¤¤
f_stend31 0.235 (0.068)¤¤¤ 0.231 (0.069)¤¤¤ 0.228 (0.068)¤¤¤
f_stend361 0.279 (0.103)¤¤¤ 0.277 (0.106)¤¤¤ 0.280 (0.106)¤¤¤
pst_female -0.145 (0.053)¤¤¤ -0.145 (0.055)¤¤¤ -0.143 (0.054)¤¤¤
pst_foreign 0.103 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.088 (0.037)¤¤ 0.093 (0.036)¤¤
pst_disabled 0.076 (0.040)¤ 0.090 (0.041)¤¤ 0.092 (0.041)¤¤
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pst_health3 0.099 (0.065) 0.075 (0.071) 0.099 (0.070)
pst_health4 0.321 (0.067)¤¤¤ 0.320 (0.074)¤¤¤ 0.340 (0.072)¤¤¤
pst_age 0.220 (0.210) 0.235 (0.227) 0.207 (0.224)
pst_agesq -0.038 (0.027) -0.040 (0.029) -0.035 (0.029)
pft 0.859 (0.052)¤¤¤ 0.803 (0.058)¤¤¤ 0.517 (0.095)¤¤¤
ltend_361 -3.306 (0.115)¤¤¤ -3.479 (0.119)¤¤¤ -3.435 (0.121)¤¤¤
ltend_360 -2.682 (0.095)¤¤¤ -2.789 (0.097)¤¤¤ -2.762 (0.098)¤¤¤
ltend_180 -2.161 (0.077)¤¤¤ -2.220 (0.079)¤¤¤ -2.199 (0.080)¤¤¤
ltend_90 -1.481 (0.069)¤¤¤ -1.530 (0.070)¤¤¤ -1.520 (0.071)¤¤¤
ltend_30 -0.542 (0.066)¤¤¤ -0.590 (0.066)¤¤¤ -0.583 (0.067)¤¤¤
ltend91 -0.178 (0.058)¤¤¤ -0.162 (0.058)¤¤¤ -0.153 (0.059)¤¤
ltend181 -0.361 (0.063)¤¤¤ -0.330 (0.064)¤¤¤ -0.306 (0.067)¤¤¤
ltend361 -0.515 (0.090)¤¤¤ -0.468 (0.091)¤¤¤ -0.425 (0.096)¤¤¤
ltend541 -0.869 (0.092)¤¤¤ -0.795 (0.095)¤¤¤ -0.724 (0.105)¤¤¤
lntft -0.095 (0.050)¤ -0.081 (0.056) -0.096 (0.057)¤
lntftsq 0.017 (0.007)¤¤ 0.019 (0.007)¤¤ 0.020 (0.008)¤¤¤
pft_female 0.177 (0.039)¤¤¤ 0.200 (0.043)¤¤¤ 0.200 (0.043)¤¤¤
pft_foreign 0.169 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.161 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.171 (0.047)¤¤¤
pft_disabled 0.038 (0.023)¤ 0.052 (0.025)¤¤ 0.060 (0.025)¤¤
pft_health3 0.075 (0.077) 0.131 (0.084) 0.132 (0.085)
pft_health4 0.222 (0.080)¤¤¤ 0.263 (0.088)¤¤¤ 0.268 (0.088)¤¤¤
pft_age 0.532 (0.261)¤¤ 0.471 (0.284)¤ 0.486 (0.288)¤
pft_agesq -0.089 (0.034)¤¤¤ -0.078 (0.037)¤¤ -0.080 (0.038)¤¤
pft_education3 -0.171 (0.039)¤¤¤ -0.211 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.206 (0.043)¤¤¤
Intercept -5.947 (0.076)¤¤¤ -5.989 (0.092)¤¤¤ -6.010 (0.092)¤¤¤
Unemployment to Short-Term Training
bhaz40 -0.204 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.223 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.219 (0.036)¤¤¤
bhaz90 -0.087 (0.037)¤¤ -0.122 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.116 (0.038)¤¤¤
bhaz150 0.017 (0.046) -0.027 (0.046) -0.020 (0.047)
bhaz190 -0.023 (0.034) -0.075 (0.035)¤¤ -0.067 (0.036)¤
bhaz760 -0.212 (0.060)¤¤¤ -0.266 (0.061)¤¤¤ -0.258 (0.061)¤¤¤
foreign -0.148 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.148 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.148 (0.027)¤¤¤
daqtiv 0.125 (0.028)¤¤¤ 0.130 (0.028)¤¤¤ 0.129 (0.028)¤¤¤
seasonwork -0.179 (0.048)¤¤¤ -0.179 (0.048)¤¤¤ -0.179 (0.048)¤¤¤
rtyp3 -0.091 (0.031)¤¤¤ -0.095 (0.031)¤¤¤ -0.094 (0.031)¤¤¤
rtyp4 -0.223 (0.044)¤¤¤ -0.230 (0.044)¤¤¤ -0.229 (0.044)¤¤¤
rtyp5 -0.152 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.162 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.161 (0.035)¤¤¤
occupation3 -0.091 (0.085) -0.091 (0.085) -0.090 (0.085)
occupation4 -0.037 (0.036) -0.037 (0.036) -0.037 (0.036)
occupation5 0.074 (0.044)¤ 0.074 (0.044)¤ 0.074 (0.044)¤
occupation6 0.146 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.148 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.147 (0.042)¤¤¤
occupation7 0.053 (0.049) 0.057 (0.049) 0.056 (0.049)
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occupation8 -0.060 (0.063) -0.060 (0.063) -0.060 (0.063)
industry3 0.289 (0.039)¤¤¤ 0.302 (0.039)¤¤¤ 0.299 (0.039)¤¤¤
industry5 0.226 (0.040)¤¤¤ 0.236 (0.040)¤¤¤ 0.234 (0.040)¤¤¤
industry6 0.198 (0.043)¤¤¤ 0.208 (0.043)¤¤¤ 0.206 (0.043)¤¤¤
industry7 0.075 (0.047) 0.089 (0.047)¤ 0.086 (0.047)¤
agegroup2 -0.034 (0.036) -0.031 (0.036) -0.032 (0.036)
agegroup3 -0.062 (0.036)¤ -0.057 (0.036) -0.058 (0.036)
agegroup4 -0.153 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.146 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.148 (0.038)¤¤¤
agegroup5 -0.313 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.304 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.305 (0.043)¤¤¤
agegroup6 -0.721 (0.056)¤¤¤ -0.705 (0.056)¤¤¤ -0.708 (0.056)¤¤¤
family4 0.197 (0.049)¤¤¤ 0.200 (0.049)¤¤¤ 0.199 (0.049)¤¤¤
family5 -0.155 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.155 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.155 (0.024)¤¤¤
health3 -0.057 (0.042) -0.049 (0.042) -0.051 (0.042)
health4 -0.154 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.146 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.147 (0.043)¤¤¤
disabled 0.094 (0.020)¤¤¤ 0.094 (0.020)¤¤¤ 0.094 (0.020)¤¤¤
seekpt -0.218 (0.042)¤¤¤ -0.218 (0.042)¤¤¤ -0.218 (0.042)¤¤¤
taredu3 0.067 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.060 (0.025)¤¤ 0.062 (0.025)¤¤
taredu4 0.100 (0.059)¤ 0.094 (0.059) 0.096 (0.059)
tarexp -0.034 (0.036) -0.032 (0.036) -0.032 (0.036)
earlycontact 0.141 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.138 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.139 (0.025)¤¤¤
q2 0.066 (0.030)¤¤ 0.066 (0.030)¤¤ 0.066 (0.030)¤¤
q3 0.138 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.137 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.137 (0.027)¤¤¤
y20002001 0.336 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.338 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.338 (0.042)¤¤¤
y2002 0.519 (0.050)¤¤¤ 0.540 (0.050)¤¤¤ 0.537 (0.050)¤¤¤
y20032004 0.714 (0.047)¤¤¤ 0.743 (0.047)¤¤¤ 0.739 (0.047)¤¤¤
lwquart2 0.065 (0.035)¤ 0.063 (0.035)¤ 0.064 (0.035)¤
lwquart3 0.136 (0.035)¤¤¤ 0.132 (0.035)¤¤¤ 0.133 (0.035)¤¤¤
lwquart4 -0.057 (0.038) -0.061 (0.038) -0.060 (0.038)
hasclaim -0.144 (0.085)¤ -0.131 (0.085) -0.133 (0.085)
totclaim 0.038 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.037 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.037 (0.012)¤¤¤
totclaimsq -0.001 (0.000)¤ -0.001 (0.000)¤ -0.001 (0.000)¤
season2 0.265 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.258 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.259 (0.031)¤¤¤
season3 0.136 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.128 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.129 (0.032)¤¤¤
season4 -0.078 (0.032)¤¤ -0.082 (0.032)¤¤ -0.082 (0.032)¤¤
Intercept -7.722 (0.125)¤¤¤ -7.898 (0.132)¤¤¤ -7.845 (0.132)¤¤¤
Unemployment to Long-Term Training
bhaz90 0.209 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.206 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.202 (0.045)¤¤¤
bhaz140 0.275 (0.048)¤¤¤ 0.272 (0.050)¤¤¤ 0.267 (0.050)¤¤¤
bhaz190 0.188 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.182 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.176 (0.047)¤¤¤
bhaz370 -0.362 (0.058)¤¤¤ -0.362 (0.060)¤¤¤ -0.372 (0.061)¤¤¤
daqtiv 0.360 (0.039)¤¤¤ 0.361 (0.039)¤¤¤ 0.361 (0.039)¤¤¤
female -0.032 (0.035) -0.030 (0.035) -0.030 (0.035)
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foreign -0.193 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.195 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.194 (0.035)¤¤¤
ethnicgerman 0.399 (0.076)¤¤¤ 0.398 (0.077)¤¤¤ 0.398 (0.076)¤¤¤
seasonwork -0.297 (0.065)¤¤¤ -0.300 (0.065)¤¤¤ -0.300 (0.065)¤¤¤
bluecollar -0.124 (0.050)¤¤ -0.122 (0.050)¤¤ -0.123 (0.050)¤¤
whitecollar 0.107 (0.048)¤¤ 0.109 (0.048)¤¤ 0.108 (0.048)¤¤
land2 0.319 (0.073)¤¤¤ 0.319 (0.073)¤¤¤ 0.320 (0.073)¤¤¤
land3 0.097 (0.042)¤¤ 0.099 (0.042)¤¤ 0.098 (0.042)¤¤
land6 0.092 (0.052)¤ 0.093 (0.052)¤ 0.092 (0.052)¤
land7 0.204 (0.060)¤¤¤ 0.203 (0.060)¤¤¤ 0.203 (0.060)¤¤¤
land8 0.215 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.223 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.219 (0.044)¤¤¤
land9 0.152 (0.041)¤¤¤ 0.153 (0.041)¤¤¤ 0.152 (0.041)¤¤¤
education4 -0.147 (0.081)¤ -0.147 (0.081)¤ -0.147 (0.081)¤
schooling3 0.204 (0.048)¤¤¤ 0.207 (0.048)¤¤¤ 0.205 (0.048)¤¤¤
schooling4 0.512 (0.061)¤¤¤ 0.517 (0.061)¤¤¤ 0.515 (0.061)¤¤¤
occupation5 0.044 (0.049) 0.044 (0.049) 0.044 (0.049)
occupation6 0.434 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.435 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.435 (0.044)¤¤¤
occupation7 0.168 (0.053)¤¤¤ 0.169 (0.053)¤¤¤ 0.169 (0.053)¤¤¤
industry3 0.123 (0.037)¤¤¤ 0.122 (0.037)¤¤¤ 0.123 (0.037)¤¤¤
industry4 -0.420 (0.056)¤¤¤ -0.426 (0.056)¤¤¤ -0.426 (0.056)¤¤¤
industry7 -0.206 (0.041)¤¤¤ -0.201 (0.041)¤¤¤ -0.202 (0.041)¤¤¤
agegroup2 -0.077 (0.043)¤ -0.074 (0.043)¤ -0.074 (0.043)¤
agegroup34 -0.180 (0.040)¤¤¤ -0.178 (0.040)¤¤¤ -0.178 (0.040)¤¤¤
agegroup5 -0.514 (0.053)¤¤¤ -0.511 (0.053)¤¤¤ -0.510 (0.053)¤¤¤
agegroup6 -1.017 (0.066)¤¤¤ -1.012 (0.066)¤¤¤ -1.011 (0.066)¤¤¤
f_youngchild -0.151 (0.059)¤¤ -0.156 (0.060)¤¤¤ -0.153 (0.060)¤¤¤
family3 0.145 (0.071)¤¤ 0.140 (0.071)¤¤ 0.141 (0.071)¤¤
family4 0.447 (0.062)¤¤¤ 0.441 (0.062)¤¤¤ 0.442 (0.062)¤¤¤
family5 0.058 (0.031)¤ 0.054 (0.031)¤ 0.055 (0.031)¤
health4 -0.112 (0.055)¤¤ -0.116 (0.055)¤¤ -0.113 (0.055)¤¤
seekpt -0.334 (0.055)¤¤¤ -0.340 (0.055)¤¤¤ -0.339 (0.055)¤¤¤
taredu4 -0.123 (0.076) -0.127 (0.076)¤ -0.126 (0.076)¤
tarexp -0.364 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.365 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.364 (0.043)¤¤¤
earlycontact 0.328 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.324 (0.033)¤¤¤ 0.324 (0.033)¤¤¤
prevtrans -0.210 (0.031)¤¤¤ -0.198 (0.031)¤¤¤ -0.200 (0.031)¤¤¤
oﬀben -0.664 (0.236)¤¤¤ -0.665 (0.236)¤¤¤ -0.665 (0.236)¤¤¤
q3 -0.096 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.095 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.095 (0.036)¤¤¤
q4 -0.244 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.241 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.241 (0.036)¤¤¤
y2000 -0.115 (0.043)¤¤¤ -0.112 (0.044)¤¤ -0.112 (0.044)¤¤
y2001 -0.561 (0.047)¤¤¤ -0.559 (0.047)¤¤¤ -0.558 (0.047)¤¤¤
y2002 -1.137 (0.069)¤¤¤ -1.134 (0.069)¤¤¤ -1.129 (0.070)¤¤¤
y2003 -1.322 (0.078)¤¤¤ -1.322 (0.078)¤¤¤ -1.315 (0.079)¤¤¤
y2004 -1.617 (0.117)¤¤¤ -1.616 (0.118)¤¤¤ -1.609 (0.118)¤¤¤
lwquart2 0.073 (0.046) 0.071 (0.046) 0.071 (0.046)
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lwquart3 0.150 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.149 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.148 (0.046)¤¤¤
lwquart4 0.043 (0.049) 0.042 (0.049) 0.042 (0.049)
hasclaim 0.219 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.193 (0.047)¤¤¤ 0.202 (0.048)¤¤¤
ubend120 0.096 (0.064) 0.104 (0.065) 0.101 (0.065)
ubend90 0.222 (0.063)¤¤¤ 0.232 (0.063)¤¤¤ 0.230 (0.063)¤¤¤
ubend60 0.069 (0.055) 0.082 (0.055) 0.079 (0.055)
season2 -0.100 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.099 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.100 (0.038)¤¤¤
season3 0.067 (0.036)¤ 0.068 (0.037)¤ 0.067 (0.037)¤
season4 -0.527 (0.042)¤¤¤ -0.525 (0.042)¤¤¤ -0.527 (0.042)¤¤¤
pst 0.349 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.348 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.350 (0.042)¤¤¤
Intercept -7.570 (0.108)¤¤¤ -7.667 (0.123)¤¤¤ -7.655 (0.122)¤¤¤
Employment to Unemployment
bhaz60 0.208 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.291 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.288 (0.017)¤¤¤
bhaz120 -0.013 (0.019) 0.139 (0.020)¤¤¤ 0.133 (0.020)¤¤¤
bhaz180 0.130 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.329 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.320 (0.025)¤¤¤
bhaz210 0.087 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.325 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.316 (0.025)¤¤¤
bhaz240 0.482 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.763 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.757 (0.024)¤¤¤
bhaz270 0.701 (0.020)¤¤¤ 1.010 (0.023)¤¤¤ 1.008 (0.023)¤¤¤
bhaz300 0.459 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.783 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.782 (0.026)¤¤¤
bhaz330 0.152 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.485 (0.028)¤¤¤ 0.485 (0.028)¤¤¤
bhaz370 -0.456 (0.039)¤¤¤ -0.105 (0.040)¤¤¤ -0.104 (0.041)¤¤
bhaz400 -0.545 (0.031)¤¤¤ -0.177 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.175 (0.033)¤¤¤
bhaz460 -0.621 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.235 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.232 (0.035)¤¤¤
bhaz520 -0.571 (0.044)¤¤¤ -0.173 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.168 (0.046)¤¤¤
bhaz550 -0.725 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.318 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.311 (0.037)¤¤¤
bhaz610 -0.527 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.116 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.109 (0.035)¤¤¤
bhaz670 -0.488 (0.047)¤¤¤ -0.074 (0.049) -0.066 (0.049)
bhaz700 -0.244 (0.041)¤¤¤ 0.176 (0.043)¤¤¤ 0.183 (0.043)¤¤¤
bhaz735 -0.981 (0.060)¤¤¤ -0.552 (0.062)¤¤¤ -0.543 (0.062)¤¤¤
bhaz770 -0.951 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.488 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.477 (0.024)¤¤¤
female -0.092 (0.016)¤¤¤ -0.088 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.085 (0.020)¤¤¤
age -0.062 (0.070) -0.232 (0.088)¤¤¤ -0.246 (0.090)¤¤¤
agesq 0.014 (0.009) 0.038 (0.011)¤¤¤ 0.040 (0.011)¤¤¤
f_age -0.725 (0.121)¤¤¤ -0.769 (0.151)¤¤¤ -0.733 (0.153)¤¤¤
f_agesq 0.083 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.087 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.082 (0.019)¤¤¤
foreign 0.021 (0.015) 0.007 (0.019) 0.006 (0.019)
ethnicgerman -0.057 (0.028)¤¤ -0.106 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.109 (0.037)¤¤¤
seasonwork 0.313 (0.041)¤¤¤ 0.379 (0.043)¤¤¤ 0.383 (0.043)¤¤¤
land1 0.101 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.084 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.080 (0.027)¤¤¤
land2 0.112 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.145 (0.035)¤¤¤ 0.147 (0.036)¤¤¤
land3 0.060 (0.014)¤¤¤ 0.060 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.059 (0.018)¤¤¤
land4 0.103 (0.046)¤¤ 0.120 (0.054)¤¤ 0.129 (0.054)¤¤
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land6 -0.022 (0.018) -0.040 (0.022)¤ -0.040 (0.023)¤
land8 -0.064 (0.016)¤¤¤ -0.125 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.127 (0.020)¤¤¤
land9 0.061 (0.012)¤¤¤ 0.064 (0.016)¤¤¤ 0.058 (0.016)¤¤¤
schooling34 -0.035 (0.016)¤¤ -0.038 (0.019)¤¤ -0.039 (0.020)¤¤
education3 -0.173 (0.011)¤¤¤ -0.231 (0.014)¤¤¤ -0.236 (0.015)¤¤¤
education4 -0.303 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.344 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.350 (0.033)¤¤¤
whitecollar -0.099 (0.018)¤¤¤ -0.112 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.115 (0.021)¤¤¤
bluecollar 0.159 (0.016)¤¤¤ 0.177 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.176 (0.019)¤¤¤
occupation3 0.054 (0.034) 0.096 (0.045)¤¤ 0.083 (0.046)¤
occupation4 0.022 (0.014) 0.036 (0.017)¤¤ 0.032 (0.017)¤
occupation5 -0.035 (0.018)¤ -0.037 (0.022)¤ -0.039 (0.022)¤
occupation6 -0.133 (0.019)¤¤¤ -0.148 (0.022)¤¤¤ -0.146 (0.023)¤¤¤
occupation7 -0.088 (0.022)¤¤¤ -0.097 (0.026)¤¤¤ -0.096 (0.026)¤¤¤
industry3 -0.112 (0.080) -0.175 (0.085)¤¤ -0.187 (0.086)¤¤
industry4 1.112 (0.079)¤¤¤ 1.173 (0.083)¤¤¤ 1.165 (0.084)¤¤¤
industry5 0.034 (0.075) -0.009 (0.080) -0.022 (0.080)
industry6 0.211 (0.078)¤¤¤ 0.180 (0.083)¤¤ 0.168 (0.083)¤¤
industry7 -0.078 (0.079) -0.157 (0.084)¤ -0.167 (0.084)¤¤
kids -0.086 (0.012)¤¤¤ -0.118 (0.014)¤¤¤ -0.121 (0.015)¤¤¤
family3 0.174 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.244 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.247 (0.030)¤¤¤
family4 0.198 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.314 (0.035)¤¤¤ 0.317 (0.035)¤¤¤
family5 0.046 (0.011)¤¤¤ 0.113 (0.014)¤¤¤ 0.112 (0.014)¤¤¤
health 0.245 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.301 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.308 (0.026)¤¤¤
disabled 0.073 (0.003)¤¤¤ 0.088 (0.003)¤¤¤ 0.089 (0.003)¤¤¤
lwquart12 -0.276 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.275 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.280 (0.024)¤¤¤
lwquart3 -0.370 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.359 (0.025)¤¤¤ -0.363 (0.025)¤¤¤
lwquart4 -0.467 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.446 (0.025)¤¤¤ -0.452 (0.025)¤¤¤
q1 -0.213 (0.011)¤¤¤ -0.201 (0.013)¤¤¤ -0.205 (0.013)¤¤¤
q3 -0.060 (0.013)¤¤¤ -0.063 (0.014)¤¤¤ -0.064 (0.014)¤¤¤
y2000 0.101 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.025 (0.030) 0.026 (0.030)
y2001 0.221 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.151 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.152 (0.030)¤¤¤
y2002 0.401 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.330 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.330 (0.031)¤¤¤
y2003 0.491 (0.028)¤¤¤ 0.419 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.414 (0.032)¤¤¤
y2004q1 0.431 (0.037)¤¤¤ 0.341 (0.041)¤¤¤ 0.332 (0.042)¤¤¤
y2004q2 0.596 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.516 (0.040)¤¤¤ 0.502 (0.040)¤¤¤
y2004q3 0.698 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.620 (0.050)¤¤¤ 0.614 (0.051)¤¤¤
y2004q4 0.836 (0.060)¤¤¤ 0.781 (0.065)¤¤¤ 0.770 (0.065)¤¤¤
season23 -0.492 (0.090)¤¤¤ -0.454 (0.091)¤¤¤ -0.459 (0.091)¤¤¤
season4 0.613 (0.081)¤¤¤ 0.560 (0.082)¤¤¤ 0.558 (0.082)¤¤¤
s2_seasonwork -0.486 (0.054)¤¤¤ -0.529 (0.055)¤¤¤ -0.533 (0.055)¤¤¤
s3_seasonwork -0.305 (0.054)¤¤¤ -0.385 (0.055)¤¤¤ -0.388 (0.055)¤¤¤
s4_seasonwork 0.236 (0.047)¤¤¤ 0.228 (0.048)¤¤¤ 0.224 (0.048)¤¤¤
s2_industry3 0.233 (0.097)¤¤ 0.192 (0.098)¤ 0.195 (0.098)¤¤
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s2_industry4 -1.299 (0.097)¤¤¤ -1.344 (0.099)¤¤¤ -1.349 (0.099)¤¤¤
s2_industry567 0.337 (0.089)¤¤¤ 0.288 (0.090)¤¤¤ 0.292 (0.090)¤¤¤
s3_industry3 0.337 (0.096)¤¤¤ 0.272 (0.097)¤¤¤ 0.276 (0.097)¤¤¤
s3_industry4 -1.034 (0.095)¤¤¤ -1.145 (0.097)¤¤¤ -1.149 (0.097)¤¤¤
s3_industry5 0.386 (0.089)¤¤¤ 0.321 (0.090)¤¤¤ 0.324 (0.090)¤¤¤
s3_industry6 0.504 (0.093)¤¤¤ 0.437 (0.094)¤¤¤ 0.440 (0.094)¤¤¤
s3_industry7 0.692 (0.094)¤¤¤ 0.628 (0.095)¤¤¤ 0.631 (0.095)¤¤¤
s4_industry3 -0.095 (0.086) -0.081 (0.087) -0.080 (0.087)
s4_industry4 -0.875 (0.084)¤¤¤ -0.911 (0.086)¤¤¤ -0.918 (0.086)¤¤¤
s4_industry5 -0.189 (0.078)¤¤ -0.162 (0.079)¤¤ -0.162 (0.079)¤¤
s4_industry6 -0.328 (0.084)¤¤¤ -0.300 (0.085)¤¤¤ -0.300 (0.085)¤¤¤
s4_industry7 -0.091 (0.086) -0.052 (0.086) -0.051 (0.087)
dst -0.103 (0.026)¤¤¤ -0.155 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.033 (0.072)
dst_female -0.056 (0.039) -0.026 (0.045) -0.023 (0.047)
dst_foreign -0.073 (0.057) -0.055 (0.064) -0.046 (0.067)
dst_ethnicgerman -0.300 (0.120)¤¤ -0.348 (0.139)¤¤ -0.336 (0.146)¤¤
dst_health 0.478 (0.086)¤¤¤ 0.517 (0.097)¤¤¤ 0.524 (0.101)¤¤¤
dft -0.243 (0.034)¤¤¤ -0.264 (0.042)¤¤¤ 0.062 (0.096)
dft_female -0.108 (0.048)¤¤ -0.118 (0.055)¤¤ -0.133 (0.057)¤¤
dft_foreign 0.203 (0.074)¤¤¤ 0.229 (0.083)¤¤¤ 0.227 (0.086)¤¤¤
dft_ethnicgerman 0.132 (0.120) 0.163 (0.135) 0.119 (0.142)
dft_disabled 0.028 (0.013)¤¤ 0.030 (0.014)¤¤ 0.036 (0.015)¤¤
Intercept -6.182 (0.086)¤¤¤ -5.955 (0.094)¤¤¤ -5.977 (0.094)¤¤¤
Factor loadings on ﬁrst latent factor (w1)
UE to EM -0.757 (0.017)¤¤¤ -0.750 (0.018)¤¤¤
±ST 0.284 (0.077)¤¤¤
±LT 0.266 (0.084)¤¤¤
UE to ST 0.221 (0.048)¤¤¤ 0.161 (0.051)¤¤¤
UE to LT 0.086 (0.075) 0.090 (0.076)
EM to UE 0.040 (0.025) 0.037 (0.027)
°ST -0.169 (0.088)¤
°LT -0.307 (0.110)¤¤¤
Factor loadings on second latent factor (w2)
UE to EM -0.408 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.393 (0.022)¤¤¤
±ST -0.004 (0.038)
±LT -0.139 (0.055)¤¤
UE to ST 0 0
UE to LT -0.097 (0.042)¤¤ -0.068 (0.048)
EM to UE 0.651 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.620 (0.020)¤¤¤
°ST 0.105 (0.035)¤¤¤
°LT 0.089 (0.052)¤
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Probabilities
Pr(w1 = 1) 0.862 (0.011)¤¤¤ 0.846 (0.013)¤¤¤
Pr(w2 = 1) 0.273 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.301 (0.023)¤¤¤
Parameters 338 347 355
Log-L. -842,376.54 -840,349.68 -840,321.05
Observations 2,893,445 2,893,445 2,893,445
Spells 326,608 326,608 326,608
Individuals 45,420 45,420 45,420
Notes: Speciﬁcation 1 refers to an alternative model with no unobserved heterogeneity and spec-
iﬁcation 2 to an alternative model without unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀects.
Speciﬁcation 3 is the main model discussed in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤
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